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ABSTRACT 
The Importance of Explicitly Mapping Instructional 
Analogies in Science Education 
by 
Loretta Asay 
Dr. LeAnn Putney, Examination Committee Co-Chair 
Chair, Department of Educational Psychology and Higher Education 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
Dr. Ralph E. Reynolds, Examination Committee Co-Chair 
Director, School of Education 
Iowa State University 
Analogies are ubiquitous during instruction in science classrooms, yet research 
about the effectiveness of using analogies has produced mixed results. An aspect seldom 
studied is a model of instruction when using analogies. The few existing models for 
instruction with analogies have not often been examined quantitatively. The Teaching 
With Analogies (TWA) model (Glynn, 1991) is one of the models frequently cited in the 
variety of research about analogies. The TWA model outlines steps for instruction, 
including the step of explicitly mapping the features of the source to the target. An 
experimental study was conducted to examine the effects of explicitly mapping the 
features of the source and target in an analogy during computer-based instruction about 
electrical circuits. Explicit mapping was compared to no mapping and to a control with 
no analogy. 
Participants were ninth- and tenth-grade biology students who were each 
randomly assigned to one of three conditions (no analogy module, analogy module, or 
iii 
explicitly mapped analogy module) for computer-based instruction. Subjects took a pre-
test before the instruction, which was used to assign them to a level of previous 
knowledge about electrical circuits for analysis of any differential effects. After the 
instruction modules, students took a post-test about electrical circuits. Two weeks later, 
they took a delayed post-test. 
 No advantage was found for explicitly mapping the analogy. Learning patterns 
were the same, regardless of the type of instruction. Those who knew the least about 
electrical circuits, based on the pre-test, made the most gains. After the two-week delay, 
this group maintained the largest amount of their gain. 
 Implications exist for science education classrooms, as analogy use should be 
based on research about effective practices. Further studies are suggested to foster the 
building of research-based models for classroom instruction with analogies. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Children carry treasure boxes of knowledge and experiences to their science 
classrooms. The challenge for teachers is to find ways to use that treasure. Used 
strategically, analogies can unlock that knowledge and put it to work developing or 
refining scientific understanding of phenomena. Analogies are ubiquitous in the world of 
science education and have been the focus of much research over the last 30 years. 
Models of analogy use have been proposed, developmental aspects have been studied, 
analogies in textbooks have been analyzed, computer models have been built, and 
research on the cognitive processes involved has been done. After all of this research, the 
efficacy of analogies is still questioned, as mixed results have been found. 
Analogies provide a way to link and organize new information based on previous 
knowledge. From what we know of the processes of learning, these tools should be useful 
for learning. Therefore, strategies for analogy use should be based on both learning 
theory and evidence of effect. The purpose of this study was to quantitatively examine 
the effectiveness of a classroom model of analogy use, specifically the step of explicitly 
mapping the components of the source and target for instruction about electrical circuits.  
Analogies 
Description of Analogies 
The term “analogy” is used to describe a variety of phenomena. In general, 
analogies are mechanisms for showing the relational structure between two systems, 
domains, or concepts, with varying degrees of similarity among features. Analogical 
reasoning is a process of aligning similarities between different ideas or systems so that 
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information is transferred from one system to another (Duit, 1991; Gentner, Bowdle, 
Wolff, & Boronat, 2001; Gentner & Markman, 1997; Holyoak, 2005).  
Analogies are conceptual models in which a familiar source provides information 
that is transferred to a less familiar or unknown target, a process of inductive reasoning. 
The useful similarity between the source and target is based on the relationships or 
structures, rather than on surface features. For example, when the solar system is used to 
understand an atom, few of the physical features are the same. However, the relationships 
between planets and the Sun allow inferences to be made about the relationships among 
subatomic particles. 
Analogies are models (Newton & Newton, 1995), and, as with all models, are 
limited as to the similarities between the source and target. If the match were exact, after 
all, the target would simply be an instance or example of the source phenomenon. At 
some point, therefore, all analogies break down. Inferences can be made about the target, 
based on the similar, but not exactly the same, relationships in the source. In the example 
used above, neither the features of or relationships among the components of our Solar 
System are the same as those among subatomic particles. 
Analogies are not metaphors, instances, or descriptions of phenomena. Metaphors 
compare implicitly and figuratively as information from one concept is mapped to 
another. Analogies explicitly map relationships, rather than physical features, from one 
concept to another. Analogies have an element of comparison, and are not examples or 
instances, which share both features and relationships (Gentner & Markman, 1997). 
Likewise, descriptions of phenomena are not comparisons; therefore, they are not 
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analogies. The distinction is that an analogy can be used to describe a phenomenon by 
transferring a familiar description to a target (Markman & Gentner, 2000).  
Analogies are used in a variety of ways. People seem to naturally use analogies 
for explaining and clarifying (Dagher, 1995; Krawcyk, Holyoak, & Hummel, 2005). 
Often analogies, especially in science education, help make an abstract concept or 
principle more concretely understandable (Paris & Glynn, 2004; Treagust, 2007). 
Teachers often use analogies to promote conceptual understanding or conceptual change 
(Brown & Clement, 1989; May, Hammer, & Roy, 2006). In problem solving, a solution 
can be mapped onto an analogous problem (Clement, 1998; Gick & Holyoak, 1983; 
Holyoak, 2005; Yanowitz, 2001). Hypotheses and theories have been generated on the 
basis of analogies, often in a pathway from one analogy to another, as understanding 
develops (May et al., 2006; Minstrell, 1982; Tohill & Holyoak, 2000). Finally, analogies 
are used to access culturally identifiable information (Valle & Callanan, 2006), such as 
proverbs about culturally valuable characteristics or cautionary tales for children. 
Types of Analogies 
With all of the ways analogies are used, it became obvious to me that the term is 
used to describe many variations of a phenomenon. To organize and focus my research, I 
identified four kinds of analogies: 1) Naturalistic analogies are sociocultural in nature. 
Some have become so embedded in our language that they call up mental images, shared 
experiences, or even technical knowledge. 2) Reading analogies tap into the rimes used 
when learning to read. Children can use the component phonemes, with which they are 
familiar, to read new word. 3) Classical analogies have a specific form to indicate the 
similar relationships in pairs. Usually this is noted as A:B::C:D, in which A is related to 
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B in the same way that C is related to D. In classical analogies, both pairs are usually 
familiar, a fundamental difference between classical and instructional analogies. 4) 
Instructional analogies promote learning; they use a transfer of information about a base 
or source to a target concept, capitalizing on existing knowledge to promote learning or 
understanding about something new. The fourth type of analogy is the focus of my 
research. 
 Instructional analogies are especially important for science education. A great 
deal of science education focuses on helping students relinquish their naïve or naturalistic 
explanations in order to understand and accept scientifically sound explanations (Driver, 
Leach, Millar, & Scott, 1996; Vosniadou, 1989). Treagust (2007) suggests that so much 
of conceptual understanding that leads to scientific reasoning is about abstract, invisible, 
or symbolic information that analogies are needed to connect everyday experiences to 
scientific understanding.  
How Analogies Work 
Cognitivism provides the theoretical basis for understanding analogies. Humans 
store information in organized networks of schema. When faced with new information, 
existing schema or chunks of knowledge are activated, and the new information is 
processed in working memory, gaining meaning from the activated schema. The new and 
the revised schema are connected to the old in networks in long-term memory (Anderson 
& Matessa, 1997; Anderson & Pearson, 1984; Bruning, Schraw, Norby, & Ronning, 
2004; Driscoll, 1994; Nussbaum, 2008; Reynolds, 2006). 
In an analogy, the existing knowledge about the structural relationships in a 
source or base phenomenon, concept, principle, or system is mapped to the structural 
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relationships in a target (Gentner & Markman, 1997). If the source and target are aligned, 
a transfer of knowledge can be made to the target. Using analogies involves several 
processes. First, an appropriate source must be retrieved, accessed, or provided. Next, the 
information must be mapped to the target. Third, the mapping is evaluated for match and 
appropriateness, and finally, inferences about the target are made through the transfer 
from the source. In the best situations, the new information is organized with the old for 
ease of future retrieval.  
These processes cannot be understood without considering what we know about 
memory. Working memory is where information processing takes place, including the 
retrieval of information from long-term memory and the mapping process in analogical 
reasoning. These processes tax the limits of working memory. The processes of chunking 
and connecting information in schema networks influence how accurately the information 
is stored and how it can be retrieved from long-term memory (Bolles, 1988; Bruning et 
al., 2004; Driscoll, 1994). Strategies, such as elaboration, which make efficient use of 
working memory capacity, are critical for learning new information. 
Developmental Aspects 
A great deal of research has probed the developmental aspects of analogical 
reasoning. Causal knowledge, an aspect of being able to make inferences, develops in 
infancy. Analogical reasoning, in general, like other types of critical thinking, improves 
with maturation. Children cannot understand analogies unless they can understand 
relationships. Piaget’s work, describing analogical reasoning as out of the reach of young 
children, influenced much of the research (Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 2002; Goswami, 
1991). However, more recently, evidence has been found that very young children are 
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able to generate and use analogies, especially if they are familiar with the source and 
target, if they can choose answers rather than generate them, and if they work with single 
relationships, rather than multiple (Goswami, 2001).  
Instruction with Analogies 
Most of the previous research about analogies in education focuses on problem 
solving, and little empirical work has been done with using analogies to promote 
learning. The use of analogies for instruction falls clearly in the guided instruction camp 
as a scaffold for learning (Pea, 2004). Purposeful selection of analogies for instruction 
requires consideration of the source and support for the transfer of information from the 
source to the target. The source used should be familiar to students, and a teacher cannot 
assume that all students have the same mental image of the source. It may be necessary to 
help students build the appropriate background knowledge of a source before using it. 
Then, students may need help understanding the process of transferring information from 
the source to the target. All of these teacher actions are components of guided instruction. 
Studies on Instruction with Analogies 
Overwhelmingly, the research on instructional analogies has been descriptive in 
nature. Teacher planning, student experiences, and classroom use have been studied 
qualitatively. (For representative examples see Brown & Clement, 1989; Dagher, 1995; 
Paatz, Ryder, Schwedes, & Scott, 2004; Thiele & Treagust, 1994; Treagust, Harrison, 
Venville, & Dagher, 1996.) Studies have also been done about the effects of multimedia 
and visual scaffolds for text-based analogies (Yanowitz, 2001; Zheng, Yang, Garcia, & 
McCadden, 2008), bridging or linked analogies (Brown & Clement, 1989; Clement, 
1993; Clement & Steinberg, 2002), and analogies used in textbooks (Curtis & Reigeluth, 
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1984; Glynn, Britton, Semrud-Clikeman, & Muth, 1989;  Orgill & Bodner, 2006; Thiele 
& Treagust, 1994; Thiele, Venville, & Treagust, 1995; Venville & Treagust, 1997).  
Most aspects and mechanisms of analogy use have been studied. These studies 
have provided evidence of the structural mapping of attributes and of mapping 
constraints, such as one-to-one comparisons (Holyoak & Thagard, 1989; Kurtz, Miao, & 
Gentner, 2001; Mason, 2004). Studies of working memory constraints and the essential 
component of elaboration have also provided evidence that the analogical reasoning 
process is complex and taxing (Tohill & Holyoak, 2000). This research has provided 
evidence that, in order for analogies to be effective, students must understand the source 
or base and be able to accurately map.  
Previous research has shown a variety of results using analogies as instructional 
tools. Treagust, Harrison, Venville, and Dagher (1996) found that high school students 
taught with text-based analogies used the taught concepts in fruitful ways and found the 
concepts more plausible than did students taught without analogies, although both groups 
scored statistically the same on a post-test of knowledge. With younger children, Newton 
and Newton (1995) and Flick (1991) found that those taught with analogies were better 
able to explain the new concepts. Yanowitz (2001) found no significant difference in 
recall between an analogy-using group and a control group. However, students in the 
analogy group answered more inferential questions correctly than the control group 
students. Zheng et al. (2008) found that multimedia analogy presentation, which they 
theorized would active a more complex network of prior knowledge and would involve 
more senses, led to both better recall and more complex understanding. The largest effect 
was in the interaction between multimedia and analogy. Duit, Roth, Komorek, and 
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Wilbers (2001) are often cited for their mixed results for analogy use. They found that 
students needed assistance in using analogies. Students often focused on surface features 
and transferred incorrect inferences or even misconceptions. In short, the same analogy 
helped some students and was very misleading for others.  
Classroom Models of Analogy Use for Instruction 
Few classroom models of analogy use for instruction are available to teachers. 
Many suggestions are described for science teachers about analogies to use, mostly in 
trade publications (see, for example, Orgill & Thomas, 2007). However, not many 
overarching models provide guidance on how to use analogies with students during 
instruction. The General Model of Analogy Teaching or GMAT (Zeitoun, 1984) focused 
on what teachers could do to use analogies in the classroom. One of the steps was to 
guide students. A second model is the Teaching with Analogies or TWA model (Glynn, 
1991; Glynn et al., 1989). This model provides principles for evaluating instructional 
analogies and steps for using analogies, but was based on analysis of analogies in science 
textbooks, rather than pedagogical principles or research about effectiveness. A third 
model, the Focus, Action, Reflect or FAR model of teaching grew out of Australian 
teachers’ use of the TWA model (Treagust, Harrison, & Venville, 1998). This model 
includes planning the analogy use and an evaluation of the process, but, once again, 
focuses on what teachers do to prepare. The use of bridging analogies, or a series of 
analogies (Clement, 1998) could also be considered a classroom model. This model 
requires a series of analogies that help a student accept and understand scientific 
principles. It does not address steps students use with analogies and could actually be 
used with any of the four models. 
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Need for Present Study 
Classroom instructional practices could be better informed by educational 
research (Stanovich & Stanovich, 2003). With all of the previous research on using 
analogies in classrooms, however, the question to ask becomes why analogy use 
sometimes works and sometimes makes little difference in improving science 
understanding. Studies that required students to specifically use strategies related to 
analogy use provide evidence that strategic use can support deeper learning. Children 
taught to find relationships or those required to compare the source and target have 
learned best using analogies for science concepts (Blake, 2004; Brown, 1989; Goswami, 
2001). The learned strategies persisted over time, as did the learning associated with 
them.  
Kurtz et al. (2001) found that structured joint interpretation of the source and 
target by forming explicit correspondences helped university students understand 
concepts. Klein, Piacente-Cimini, and Williams (2007) found that requiring 
undergraduate students in a problem-solving task to write about the mapping was related 
to better explanations of the concepts. Gentner, Loewenstein, and Thompson (2003) 
found that students were better able to identify the underlying principle and transfer it to 
a different scenario if they were required to map and align two cases or examples. 
Comparing was related to better schemata for knowledge, related to transfer to the target, 
related to identifying the underlying principle, and required effort and guidance. Brown 
(1989) and her colleagues found that even very young children were able to use analogies 
for learning if the researcher suggested a strategy of remembering the source. I cite these 
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examples as evidence that strategies or explicit instructions for appropriately using the 
mechanisms of an analogy can make a difference.  
Few of the existing classroom models have been quantitatively tested; most 
research has been qualitative and descriptive. The classroom models of analogy use 
proposed in the literature have no theoretical basis and have not been aligned with other 
educational research findings. There is a need for theoretically based research on how 
analogies could be used effectively. It is therefore important to the field of science 
education that evidence be gathered about the efficacy of the classroom models and their 
components.  
One of the critical features of analogical reasoning is the mapping process. 
Features of the source and target must be aligned so that objects and predicates from one 
are matched to objects and predicates of the other. The inferences that are taken from the 
source help the learner develop and organize knowledge about the target (Gentner & 
Kurtz, 2006; Holyoak, 2005; Richland, Holyoak, & Stigler, 2004). I suggest that students 
need to be able to map in order to transfer inferences from the source to the target. A 
classroom model of analogy use needs to provide for this mapping process. 
The Teaching With Analogies (TWA) model proposed by Glynn (1991) includes 
six operations or strategies. These six steps, however, were determined through analysis 
of textbooks and have not been tested quantitatively. One of the central operations of this 
model is the mapping process. Research has shown that features of the source and target 
must be aligned so that features and predicates from one are matched to features and 
predicates of the other. The inferences that are taken from the source help the learner 
develop knowledge about the target (Gentner & Kurtz, 2006; Holyoak, 2005; Richland et 
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al., 2004). However, the question remains whether the features of the source and target 
must be explicitly mapped or if this step can be eliminated or treated casually in the 
classroom.  
Purpose of Study 
 The purpose of this study was to investigate whether explicitly mapping the 
features of the analogy source and target, a component of the TWA model, helps students 
learn and retain understanding of a science concept. Three research questions guided the 
study: (a) Does explicit mapping of the source and target promote more learning than 
using an analogy without explicit mapping? (b) Do more-knowledgeable and less-
knowledgeable learners benefit differentially from mapping? and (c) Are there any 
benefits over time related to either of the first two questions? I hypothesized that explicit 
mapping of the source and target would lead to more learning than using an analogy 
without explicit mapping. I proposed that this would provide extra scaffolding will 
provide differentiation and be more pronounced for learners who previously knew little 
about the topic. I hypothesized that both of these effects would persist over time. 
Overview of the Study 
Methods 
High school students (N = 436), ages 14 and 15, in biology classes were randomly 
assigned to receive computer-based instruction about electrical circuits without an 
analogy, instruction about electrical circuits with an unmapped analogy, or computer-
based instruction about electrical circuits with an explicitly mapped analogy. Students 
were classified as Level 1 (lowest), Level 2, or Level 3 (highest) based on their previous 
knowledge of electrical circuits as measured on a pre-test. Pre-test, post-test, and delayed 
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post-test scores on a test about electrical circuits were used to gauge learning and 
persistence of learning. The repeated measures 3 X 3 X 3 factorial design allowed for 
analysis of effects and interactions among previous science knowledge level, type of 
analogy instruction, and time. 
The decision to use the concept of electrical circuits was based on the Nevada 
State Science Standard P.12.C.6: “Students know electrical circuits provide a means of 
transferring electrical energy to produce heat, light, sound, and chemical changes” and its 
performance indicators for meeting the standard: “Demonstrate the use of an electrical 
circuit.” The exceeding standard indicator for eighth-grade is: “Describe the generation 
and conduction of electricity.” (Nevada Department of Education, n.d.).  
Three different forms of a 20-question multiple-choice test on electrical circuits 
were used for the pre-test, post-test and delayed post-test. Three 20-minute computer-
based instruction modules provided the three types of instruction.  
Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (RM-ANOVA) was used to determine 
interaction effects and practical significance. Where interactions were significant, they 
were followed by analysis of simple effects and simple contrasts. Otherwise, main effects 
were tested to evaluate which variables influenced the learning, as measured by scores on 
the tests. 
Discussion 
This study found no advantage for explicitly mapping the source and target 
features when using an analogy. All three types of instruction (no analogy, with an 
analogy, and with an explicitly mapped analogy) produced the same pattern of learning. 
Subjects made significant gains, as measured by the post-test after instruction. This 
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persisted over the two-week gap before the delayed post-test, and students’ scores were 
still significantly above their pre-test scores. Those who knew the least about electrical 
circuits benefitted the most from all three types of instruction. The explicitly mapped 
analogy was useful to the students, but not more than the other types of instruction. This 
is one step of the TWA classroom model for analogy use, a model frequently cited but 
seldom studied quantitatively.  
It is important to note that there may be other advantages for using explicitly 
mapped analogies, which were not studied. They may be more interesting or 
understandable to students. It may be that explicitly mapped analogies are valuable for 
addressing science misconceptions. Other important components and processes of 
learning may be aided by using mapped analogies. These, and other possible advantages 
should be studied. 
Limitations 
 There were several limitations of this study. First of all, this study was done 
within a limited age group. This age group has been previously used, however, in studies 
of instruction with analogies (Brown & Clement, 1989; Duit et al., 2001; Mason, 2004). 
Second, there was a single topic or concept used. It may be that analogy use needs to 
adjust, based on the topic. Third, the instruction modules may not have been different 
enough to allow identification of interactions or effects. Finally, the instrument used to 
measure learning may not have been appropriate for identifying interactions or effects. 
Despite these acknowledged limitations, this study attempted to start filling in the gaps in 
empirical evidence for how analogies can be effectively used in science classrooms. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION: ANALOGIES AS LEARNING TOOLS 
 This study is grounded in three bodies of research. First is the research about how 
students learn and how analogies work for learning. This will be explained from a 
cognitive orientation. Second is the research that has been done of analogy use in science 
education. Finally, there is a small body of research about classroom models that have 
been suggested for educational use. 
Operational Definitions 
Learning. Knowledge. Cognition. Many terms used in educational research can 
get in the way of clear understanding. To avoid this, I will use “learning,” “knowledge,” 
and “cognition” distinctly rather than interchangeably. “Learning” is a change centered in 
an individual--in understanding of concepts, in skills, in attitude, in schema, in capacity, 
etc. I will use “knowledge” when referring to the product of learning. “Knowledge” is the 
purpose of most formal education and is measured in a variety of ways. “Cognition” will 
be used when describing the complex, interactive system of processes that make up 
learning. 
Analogies. The term “analogy” is often used to describe a variety of phenomena. 
In general, analogies are mechanisms for showing the relational structure between two 
systems, domains, or concepts, with varying degrees of similarity among features. 
Analogical reasoning is a process of aligning similarities between different ideas or 
systems so information is transferred from one system to another (Duit, 1991; Gentner, et 
al., 2001; Gentner & Markman, 1997; Holyoak, 2005). Whether implicit or explicit, an 
analogy is a comparison. In the literature, one side of the comparison is labeled the target 
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(for example, see Harrison & Treagust, 2000). The familiar side of the comparison is the 
base (for example, see Glynn, 2008), source (for example, see Kim & Choi, 2003) or 
analog, which can refer to either the source or the target (for example, see Glynn & 
Takahashi, 1998). I will use “source,” rather than “base,” to emphasize my research focus 
on learning.  
Cognitive Orientation 
To understand what is known about learning from analogical reasoning, it is 
necessary to understand what is known about cognition, for “analogy does not occur in 
isolation; it works in conjunction with other psychological processes” (Dunbar, 2001, p. 
318). Learning has typically been seen as either experience-centered and externally 
driven or mind-centered and internally shaped (Reynolds, Sinatra, & Jetton, 1996). A 
cognitive orientation takes into account unseen processes, as opposed to a behaviorist 
orientation which portrays learning as externally driven. While internal processing cannot 
be observed, scientists accept reasonable and adequate explanations for these 
unobservable processes, inferred from observations. Many of these inferences are being 
corroborated as improved technology and medical research provide insight into the 
workings of the human brain (Holyoak & Hummel, 2001). 
Mind-Centered Paradigm 
Models. 
Information processing model. Within the cognitivist paradigm, many models 
have been suggested to explain how cognition works. The development of computers 
gave rise to an information-processing model. The computer is used as a metaphor for 
human learning, with inputs, processing, and outputs (Newell & Simon, 1972; Reynolds 
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et al., 1996). The brain’s physical neural systems are seen as hardware (Baars, 1986). 
Processing is described as inputs going into sensory memory. If attention is allocated, the 
inputs enter into short-term memory or trigger the output of a response. In short-term 
memory, there is encoding that allowed storage in long-term memory. When information 
is needed, retrieval takes place, and the information is outputted (Bruning et al., 2004; 
Driscoll, 1994; Myers, 1989).  
Modal model. Information processing models do not explain very well how 
information is organized and stored. The more generally accepted modal model is of 
information being processed in a variety of types of memory. Sensory memory provides 
initial perceptions of incoming stimuli. Then, in working memory, that information is 
processed and encoded for storage in long-term memory. We know that it is not a simple 
through-put of information, however. A relationship exists between long-term memory 
and how we perceive stimuli. In addition two-way communication takes place between 
long-term memory and the processing that happens in working memory, affected by 
metacognitive processes, the context, and even by the stimuli themselves (Bolles, 1986; 
Driscoll, 1994; Myers, 1989).  
Working memory. While long-term memory is considered boundless, working 
memory is limited, in both duration and capacity. The demands placed on working 
memory can be inherent to the properties or nature of the information, or they can be a 
function of the activity, context, or characteristics of the learner (Bruning et al., 2004). 
Different kinds of processing use different amounts of the limited working memory 
resources (van Merrienboer, & Sweller, 2005). 
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Research has provided evidence of how the limited resources within working 
memory are used strategically. Much depends on the attention allocated and the way the 
information is presented. Some processing of information is automatic and unconscious. 
Goals, emotions, evaluations, judgments, and perceptions can influence processing. 
Bargh and Chartrand (1999) explain that automaticity can free up limited conscious 
capacity and capacity can be shaped by both experiences and volition.  
Because allocation of attention affects the processing of information, it is 
important to know whether it is allocated automatically or can be controlled by the 
learner. Evidence has been found for both. Studies have found evidence that the learner 
can make decisions about allocating attention and the environment, such as a text, can 
have features that influence the amount of attention allocated (Reynolds, 1992). Attention 
is often allocated and shared, based on competing goals (Driscoll, 1994; Pintrich, 2000).  
Decisions about allocating attention are aspects of metacognition. Metacognitive 
strategies can be modeled and taught, as evidenced by studies on self-efficacy and self-
regulated learning (Pintrich, 2000). The important aspect, though, is that learners can 
select strategies appropriate to a situation and this affects learning. It also means that 
learners can select strategies that are not appropriate or efficient, especially if they lack 
the background to decide, do not have goals to do so, make decisions based on inaccurate 
automatic responses, or have beliefs that contradict the new information. 
Long-term memory. Network analogies are most often used to describe long-term 
memory. The Adaptive Control of Thought (ACT, now ACT-Rational) model describes 
how categorical information and content are encoded in schema. As information is added 
and encoded, connections between schema are made. Through this process of spreading 
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activation, stronger cumulative connections are made (Anderson & Matessa, 1997; 
Bruning et al., 2004). In connectionist models, units of information are stored, but the 
connection strength and the distribution of the connections are the important aspects. 
Familiarity is evidence of a connection being activated (Bruning et al., Nussbaum, 2008).  
Driscoll describes how retrieval uses cues or recognition of similarities in the 
long-term memory, which is organized as a hierarchal network of discrete particles of 
information. The retrieval could be described with a feature comparison model, a 
propositional network model, or a semiotic structure model. Information is taken apart, 
stored, and then reconstructed for retrieval. With this model, all input is stored forever; 
forgetting is a retrieval problem (Driscoll, 1994).  
Schemata provide the organization for information. Anderson and Pearson (1984) 
explain a schema as a structure, abstract not physical. Schemata can be compared to 
scripts or procedures in that they construct how knowledge is situated or compared to 
theories because they predict and influence (Reynolds, 2006). Schemata can be historical, 
content, beliefs (Anderson, Reynolds, Schallert, & Goetz, 1977) or cultural (Reynolds, 
Taylor, Steffensen, Shirey, & Anderson, 1982).  
Schemata are organized in a hierarchy, represent many kinds and levels of 
knowledge, and are active and changing (Bruning et al., 2004; Reynolds et al., 1996). As 
new information is added, processing fits the newer information with the existing 
schema. Learning is facilitated when clear fits are found and the learner can make the 
connections. This process requires inference on the part of the learner, constructing of 
knowledge, and selective attention (Anderson & Pearson, 1984). No text is totally 
explicit and no conversation is complete; the participants must bring the meaning to 
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them. Even the simplest schema is very complex in its inter-relationships with other 
schemata and filled slots.  
For understanding the mechanisms of analogical reasoning, we must 
conceptualize how information is stored. Original information is not stored. Information 
is stored as declarative or procedural, and it is chunked and encoded in semantic or 
meaningful units and propositional units, with links that associate and connect the units. 
Memories are coded for their meaning, semantically, and are retrieved in chunks (Bolles, 
1988; Bruning et al., 2004; Driscoll, 1994). What we consider the meaning of a memory 
is provided by the connections (Nussbaum, 2008). Upon retrieval, they are re-created and 
influenced by their connections to other memories (Christianson & Nilsson, 1989; 
Corkill, Bruning, & Glover, 1988; Loftus, 2003). Thus, we use the metaphor of semantic 
and propositional networks.  
It is important to note that schemata are not simply paradigms that shape behavior 
or beliefs. They are the metaphorical structures that organize knowledge and allow for 
meaning and comprehension. Learning is an internal process of attending to, evaluating, 
and fitting information to existing knowledge. Because of this, prior knowledge can 
facilitate understanding or it can derail it (Anderson et al., 1977). This collection of 
models explains how new information is received, encoded, connected and stored by a 
learner and provides explanation for how critical existing knowledge is for meaning and 
sense making. While acknowledging the importance of background knowledge on 
learning, these models do not explain all of the processes that are included in cognition. 
Transfer. We think of transfer as moving something from one place to another. In 
the case of cognition, the substance and connections of schemata are moved or copied to 
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new information or problems. This is manifested when a learner applies skills or 
knowledge from one domain to another or in a new context (Nussbaum, 1999). Retrieval 
of information, in order to transfer, is influenced by context, depth of processing, and 
cues. It is fostered by similarities, modeling, practice, and examples (Nussbaum, 2008).  
Influences on Cognition 
Bi-directional nature of memory. For understanding how analogies can support 
learning, it is necessary to understand that working memory and long-term memory are 
intimately connected. Incoming information is processed and encoded in working 
memory, based on what is stored in long-term memory. Even affective influences and 
socio-cultural influences are based on information, attitudes, and skills encoded in long-
term memory.  
Elaboration. The many strategies that use working memory resources fall under 
the umbrella of elaboration. Elaboration is the work of creating or strengthening multiple 
connections among nodes. As information is processed more deeply or through 
repetition, connections are activated and further connections are made (Flavell et al., 
2002; Nussbaum, 1999; 2008). This becomes the focus of many classroom activities and 
even homework assignments, as students repeat, use worked examples, read new 
information, and collaborate. Students can be taught strategies that provide elaboration 
and improve the encoding, retrieval, and application of knowledge. The list of strategies 
is beyond the scope of the current literature review; however, a few examples are 
appropriate. Evidence has been provided for strategies such as rehearsal, chunking, and 
analyzing (Bruning et al., 2004). Students can be provided opportunities to come up with 
their own organizational structure, helping them learn (Nussbaum, 1999; 2011). 
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Argumentation (Nussbaum, 2002), problem-solving (Griffin & Jitendra, 2009), 
reconstructing meaning (Wade-Stine & Kintsch, 2004), worked examples (Salden, 
Aleven, Renkl, & Schwonke, 2009), self-explanation (Chi, 2000), and student-generated 
questions (Chin, Brown, & Bruce, 2002) have all been shown to help students develop 
deeper understanding of concepts. 
Scaffolding. In science education, strategies used in guided instruction are often 
referred to as scaffolding. As Losh and Nzekwe (2011) point out, “Constructs such as 
‘priming,’ ‘schema,’ or ‘selectivity’ describing the selection and interpretation of data are 
now ubiquitous in the cognitive and education literature” (p. 4). Priming and selectivity 
are examples of scaffolds that can be provided for students. Scaffolds allow students to 
accomplish something beyond their capacities (Pea, 2004).  
Scaffolding is thought to be valuable for a number of reasons. One of the values 
of scaffolding is that it can provide models of how experts think and the strategies they 
use (Caliskan, Selcuk, & Erol, 2010). Scaffolding may help decrease the cognitive load 
on working memory (Salden et al., 2009). It can help learners see the relevant 
components of the task, model strategies, and assist with mental representation of 
concepts (Davis & Miyake, 2004), as well as direct attention where it is needed (Duit, 
1991). Scaffolding is a strategy for differentiating instruction, based on students’ needs 
and their previous knowledge (Allen & Tomlinson, 2000; Anderson, 2007; Tomlinson, 
1999).  
Developmental influences. Linked to the postulate that the human brain matures 
physically, is the observation that cognitive processing develops. Even before Piaget’s 
influential work, educators and philosophers looked for models that would describe this. 
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Neo-Piagetian researchers, such as Robbie Case, described children being able to handle 
more and more information and more and more features of a problem. Along with this, 
develops the skills for integrating them. All of this happens in tandem with increased 
storage capacity. Case accounted for the unevenness of cognitive development with a 
model of different kinds of, and generality levels of, domain knowledge. Eventually 
learners develop the ability to apply information across domains (1992). Halford 
explained the development differently, suggesting that humans increasingly and 
predictably learn to create mental models, including analogies, to solve problems (1993).  
Siegler used an information processing model, with waves of strategies being 
accessed and applied, then abandoned. Another model, known as Theory Theory, 
describes how children develop explanations or theories and then adjust or modify those 
theories as they continually test them (all researchers described in Flavell et al., 2002). 
Socio-cultural influences. A diverse body of research has explored the socio-
cultural influences on cognition and development. There is evidence that the environment 
can impact automaticity and perceptions (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Processing, as seen 
through cognitivism, conceptual change, or any of the variations on these themes, is 
internal. Socio-cultural researchers present the view that knowledge is not passed from 
one person to another, but is built through social interactions and tempered by the 
learning environment (Reynolds et al., 1996). Much of this work is based on Vygotsky’s 
writings. For a socio-culturalist, learning is the changing or transforming of socially 
shared experience into personalized and internalized knowledge. According to socio-
cultural theorists, all learning is social and, while thinking is individual, the social setting 
allows a window into that thinking (John-Steiner & Mahn, 1996). Vygotsky explained 
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that the individual and setting cannot be studied separately; instead we must look at the 
interplay. Each learner has a zone of proximal development or gap between what they 
know and can do and what they could do or learn. The social setting can be the catalyst or 
scaffold for learning (Wink & Putney, 2002). It would be difficult to argue that the social 
setting and/or the environment do not impact learning. However, it is equally difficult to 
argue that all learning is a social activity.  
Analogical Processes 
Based on this cognitive framework, I now turn to a description of the processes in 
analogical reasoning. In order to understand how analogies work, we must not lose sight 
of the purposes and contexts for various kinds of analogies, for the pragmatic constraints 
influence how each analogy works. An analogy is a process of transferring information 
about a source to a target. This cognitive process involves accessing or retrieving the 
source, mapping the information about the source onto the target, evaluating the match to 
judge the appropriateness of the mapping, using the mapping to make inferences about 
the target, and (in learning environments) organizing the new information for future 
retrieval (Gentner, 1989; Vosniadou, 1995).  
Components of Analogies 
Source. The source in an analogy should be carefully chosen, as it becomes the 
basis for learning (Aubusson, 2006; Blake, 2004), a “proto-theory” for the target (Wilbers 
& Duit, 2006, p. 39). Because the source activates the prior knowledge and shares that 
knowledge for processing new information, the source influences the learning, 
misconceptions, and decisions that are made (Markman & Moreau, 2001; Mason, 2004) 
as it activates schemata in long-term memory.  
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Ideally, the source for an instructional analogy should be familiar to students. 
Familiarity leads to less processing time and demand on working memory (Newton, 
2003). If the learner is not familiar with the source, there can be frustration and loss of 
interest (Harrison, 2006). Conversely, interest can be peaked if the source “resonates with 
the learner’s existing experience” and makes sense (Heywood & Parker, 1997, p. 88).  
Influences of the source. The source can be used to foster elaboration. 
Researchers found that, when students had to struggle to understand a source problem, it 
was more retrievable for solving a target problem. The researchers suggested that a 
difficult source problem may require building a more abstract representation of the 
problem space, a representation that could then apply to a new problem or target 
(Didierjean & Nogry, 2004). This finding fits with what we know about the importance 
of elaboration. 
The challenge for teachers is to know what learners understand about the source. 
As researchers have pointed out, there is no guarantee that all students have the same 
understanding of the source or that it matches the teachers’ (diSessa & Sherin, 1998; 
Duit, 1991). One concern is that a student who knows little about the source does not 
have an opportunity to truly compare or question source and target, an elaboration 
strategy, but must accept the alignment (Wilbers & Duit, 2006). Like using multiple 
examples, another strategy that promotes deeper processing, more than one analogy may 
be helpful in order to tap into enough meaningful knowledge, allowing more information 
from existing schemata to transfer to the target (Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Vosniadou, 
1989).  
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The source is seldom retrieved intact from long-term memory but often includes 
components and insertions from other information in memory. All of what we understand 
about memory, including the relationship between working and long-term memory, 
capacity constraints (including induced constraints such as stress), and organization of 
prior knowledge, influence source retrieval. We know that human memory is dynamic, 
personal, context-sensitive, constructive, incomplete, reliant on perceptions, and affected 
by reasoning skills (Goswami, 2001; Hmelo-Silver & Pfeffer, 2004; Kokinov & Petrov, 
2001; Larkey & Love, 2003; Richland, Morrison, & Holyoak, 2006).  
Socio-cultural influences. Different examples of relationships act as priming in 
different ways for analogies (Leech, Mareschal, & Cooper, 2008). When analogies are 
used for persuasion, for example, the persuaders are often counting on emotions 
accompanying the source (Dunbar, 2001). This underscores not only the importance of 
memory and prior knowledge, but the cultural context of the situation and the learner. 
This means that analogies are not always normative, but very culturally and 
collaboratively approached, an important feature because we cannot always easily predict 
how people will interpret analogies (Bouissac, 2008; Harrison & Treagust, 2000). 
Target. The choice of a target forms the purpose for using an analogy. What is 
known about the source can be mapped to the target. As described above, this can 
provide concrete mapping for an abstract target or associate known relationships onto 
unknown relationships. The target becomes a hypothesis to be tested, formed by what is 
known about the source (Wilbers & Duit, 2006), new information that needs an 
organizing structure (Mason 1994), or a decision that needs to be made based on a 
previous situation (Markman & Moreau, 2001).  
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Similarity between source and target. Surface similarities between the source and 
target are important for activating schemata. Subjects are more likely to cue the 
appropriate source if it has similar features to the target (Markman & Moreau, 2001). 
“Explanatory power of an analogy generally increases as the number of similar features 
shared by the analog and target increases” (Glynn, 1991, p. 226).  
Mapping. Mapping is the process of constructing an alignment of features, 
relations, or even explanations (Vosniadou, 1989), of systematically making 
correspondences between the elements of the source and those of the target (Gentner et 
al., 2001; Glynn, 2008; Glynn & Takahashi, 1998; Holyoak & Thagard, 1989; Thiele et 
al., 1995), with no regard for the number of shared relationships or even if all of the 
relationships in the source are mapped with the target (Gentner, 1983; Gick & Holyoak, 
1983). In an analogy, the source and target are symmetrical; one is not more important, 
causal, or dependent on the other (Duit, 1991); however, we usually map from the source 
to the target. The task is to map information from the source to the target while 
maintaining the system of relationships that are in the source (Gentner, 1989). The value 
of an analogy is in identifying that underlying structure or principle that is common to 
both the source and target (Duit, 1991). 
Mapping is based on mental representations of the propositions or relationships of 
the source and target, symmetrical and non-hierarchical (Wilbers & Duit, 2006). It is a 
working memory process of connecting what is known about the source with the target 
(Duit, 1991). We should consider that the comparison is happening within a person’s 
unique schemata, in light of their goals, and within a particular context (Gentner & 
Markman, 1997). In general, the process involves disregarding most of the attributes of 
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the objects or concepts, then identifying the relationships before choosing a system of 
connected relationships over isolated or individual relationships (Gentner, 1983). The 
best alignments are based on the meaning and goal of the comparison and are not based 
on syntactic but on semantic correspondence (Markman & Gentner, 2000), as that is how 
information is organized within long-term memory. 
This process taxes working memory in many ways. Any description of analogical 
mapping has to account for the inhibition of matching surface features and choosing 
relational structures. In the best analogies, surface similarity is salient enough to aid in 
recall of information but does not drive analogical reasoning (Goswami, 2001; 
Vosniadou, 1989). Conversely, when the underlying structure becomes more abstract, 
more of the surface similarity that helps with retrieval is removed (Gick & Holyoak, 
1983). Researchers found that, when the relationships were similar but not synonymous, 
the processing time was longer. In a followup study, people were given pairs of stories. 
The stories were remembered on the basis of surface similarities. However, when the 
subjects were asked to use one story to make inferences about the other, they used the 
structural similarities or relationships (Gentner, Ratterman, & Forbus, 1993). This 
preference fits with how we describe the organization of information in long-term 
memory. 
Mappings actually include both similarities and differences (Gick & Holyoak, 
1983). People attend to the alignable differences over non-alignable differences 
(Markman & Moreau, 2001). Many combinations of mappings between a source and 
target are possible; systematicity, therefore, actually puts constraints on all the possible 
relationships that could be mapped. The principle of systematicity is that there is a 
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preference for higher order, more connected relationships. If predicates in the source 
belong to a system of relationships, they are more likely to be mapped to the target than if 
they are isolated predicates. If predicates belong to a system of relationships, they are 
more likely to be mapped with the target (Gentner, 1988; 1989; Gentner, et al., 2001; 
Gentner & Markman, 1997). Based on a series of studies with adults, it appears that 
surface similarity may be used for retrieval from memory; however, judging the aptness 
of a pairing requires understanding the relationships (Brown, 1989; Gentner, 1989; 
Gentner et al., 1993; Mason, 2004) and ensures that only mapped information is carried 
to the target (Markman, 1997). It has even been suggested that identifying and discarding 
the irrelevant attributes is part of analogous thinking (Zeitoun, 1984), more burden for 
working memory.  
A constraint that actually helps working memory processing is that the 
relationships mapped are parallel in a one-to-one correspondence. In other words, a 
relationship in the source is mapped only to a single relationship in the target. This 
bidirectional parallelism is known as isomorphism, and it is critical to shaping the 
analogy (Klauer, 1989; Markman, 1997). It follows logically that the matched 
relationships will have matched arguments (Gentner & Markman, 1997; Markman, 
1997).  
Cross-mapping. This type of mapping also taxes working memory, and a great 
deal of what we understand about analogical reasoning comes from the study of cross-
mapping. Cross-mapping happens when very similar or even identical objects have very 
different roles in analogous scenarios. Usually, subjects are given analogous situations, 
graphically. For example, in a first picture, a dog may be chasing a cat, and in a second 
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picture, the dog is being chased. Because the relationship (chasing) is the same, the 
scenes are analogous; however, because the dog is first the chaser and then the object of 
the chasing, cross-mapping happens. Cross-mapping slows people down, evidence that it 
makes greater cognitive demands on working memory (Gentner & Markman, 1997).  
Inferencing and transfer. An analogy works when information from the source 
is transferred to the target. This is an inductive process (Brown, 1989; Harrison & 
Treagust, 2000; Klauer, 1989). This is possible because a system of associations in the 
source can be mapped to a system of associations in the target (Glynn et al., 1989). When 
students are taught about cells, for example, they are often asked to consider the 
relationships between components in a town or a factory, the relationships between 
structures and their functions. This previous knowledge of a town or manufacturing 
system is then mapped onto cellular structures. The relationship between the mayor’s 
office and the rest of the town is mapped onto the nucleus and the other components of 
the cell. Of course, there are unshared attributes, which limit the similarity between the 
source and the target (Venville & Treagust, 1997). The mayor’s office has no function, 
for instance, analogous to the nucleus’ function in cellular reproduction.  
The term “transfer” is used in analogy literature to describe the process of making 
inferences about the target, based on the mappings from the source. The processes of 
mapping and transfer are iterative, consisting of mapping an alignment, transferring the 
information, checking the alignment, and identifying the non-alignable components, all 
constrained by the goals and context (Clement & Gentner, 1988).  
The source provides information for inferences about the target through mental 
images of the relationships involved (Wilbers & Duit, 2006). Inferences are based on the 
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underlying relationships in the analogy (Clement & Gentner, 1988; May et al., 2006). We 
fill in what we do not know about the target from the source, a type of structural 
completion (Markman & Moreau, 2001; Newton, 2003).  
Building schemata. The most salient relationships, such as causation, are carried 
to the target. Researchers suggest that a mental representation is copied, with all of its 
attributes and predicates attached, then substituted into the unknown target to form a new 
mental representation about the target (Holyoak, 2005; Markman, 1997). The process 
includes a re-representation in the target and building a more abstract schema. Unless the 
knowledge is actually re-represented, the transfer would be literal and interfere with an 
accurate mental model of the target concept. Strong transfer depends on relational 
correspondences, while retrieval depends heavily on surface similarities, so re-
representation takes place as the relationships that underlay one set of features must 
associate with different features in the target (Kurtz et al., 2001). Either the source 
projects meaning onto the target or parallel meanings develop (Gentner et al., 2001). The 
inferences about the target become new schemata that are then encoded in memory, 
shaped by the goals of the subject and strengthened by connections with previous 
knowledge (Gentner, 1989; Holyoak, 2005). 
The importance of existing schemata cannot be downplayed. For example, when 
white blood cells are analogous to soldiers, young children infer that the white blood cells 
will kill germs and that germs are bad. However, they usually rely on the schemata they 
have about soldiers and infer that the white blood cells could get hurt in this battle 
(Vosniadou, 1989). 
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Developmental aspects. Piaget saw analogy use as evidence of a developmental 
stage, and said that children at the beginning of the formal operational reasoning stage 
would be able to categorize, use inclusion, compare, and see similarities in relations. 
Formal operational reasoning would be needed to understand multiple relationships, such 
as a:b as c:d (Goswami, 1991; 2001; Vosniadou, 1995). Children, especially young ones, 
map surface features (Loewenstein & Gentner, 2001), a kind of functional fixedness that 
interferes with analogical reasoning (Solomon, 1994). Gentner coined the term “relational 
shift” to describe the shift in focus from surface features to underlying structures; 
children start out using surface features to interpret an analogy and change to an 
interpretation based on relationships. In her studies, children between five and six years 
old could interpret significantly fewer relationships than nine- and ten-year-olds and 
adults (Gentner, 1988; 1989); this was seen as evidence of a developmental component to 
analogical reasoning (Holyoak, 2005).  
However, other researchers, most noteworthy being Goswami, provide evidence 
that analogical reasoning starts in infancy and is naturally used well before Piaget’s 
formal operational stage. For example, my barely four-year-old grand-daughter, much too 
young for Piaget’s formal operational stage, was cutting paper into small pieces with 
scissors. She noticed her baby sister step on a cracker and smash it. “Grandma, my 
scissors are like Tallie’s foot,” she informed me. 
There are four possible explanations for why analogical reasoning is spotty in 
young children. First, working memory capacity increases as children develop. Second, 
understanding of relationships develops. Third, content knowledge develops and 
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increases. Fourth, the task of analogical reasoning becomes understood better as a child 
grows up. 
Limits to working memory increase as children develop. Young children, for 
example, struggle to hold enough information in memory to compare possible sources, let 
alone use that information (Kim & Choi, 2003). Older children can compare more 
relationships than younger children (Goswami, 2001). Working memory capacity is 
critical for being able to notice the relationships, for mapping (Tohill & Holyoak, 2000), 
to retrieve prior knowledge from long-term memory, to inhibit superfluous information 
(Leech et al., 2008), to build mental representations, and to compare relationships 
(Goswami, 2001). Even adults, when working memory is taxed, revert to surface 
mappings (Tohill & Holyoak, 2000).  
Perhaps young children map on surface features because they do not have well-
developed understandings of relationships (Brown, 1989; Goswami, 1991), 
understanding that is known to be developmental (Smith, 1989). Relationships, after all, 
require more complex schemata than do surface features. In one study, very young 
children had difficulty lining up objects from smallest to largest. However, when they 
referred to the objects as the “daddy,” “mommy,” and “baby,” they had no difficulty with 
the task (Mix, 2008). Young children are able to use stories with morals (explicit 
relational structure) analogously better than stories without explicit relational structure 
(Goswami, 2001). Children as young as two and three years old can use relationships for 
inferences, even in the absence of surface similarity, if the relationships are pointed out to 
them (Brown, 1989; Goswami, 1991).  
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Understanding relationships may be tied to content knowledge. When a child has 
more knowledge on which to draw, it may be more likely that an analogy can be used. In 
several studies, the classical analogies used by Piaget were changed to pairings very 
young children would recognize, and they were much more competent than was predicted 
for their ages (Goswami, 2001). Studies of experts (Clement & Gentner, 1988) using 
analogies and research with young children both provide evidence of how important the 
content knowledge is (Leech et al., 2008). Dunbar (2001) points out, however, that in 
natural settings both children and adults are more likely to use relationships than they do 
in laboratory or contrived settings, disputing that content knowledge is always crucial.  
Finally, children are better able to use analogies when they understand the actual 
task. When young children understand the “rules of the game” or have procedural 
knowledge, their competence with analogies increases dramatically (Brown, 1989). The 
development of analogical reasoning parallels development of metacognitive strategies; 
when children can reflect on their knowledge, they become more capable of using 
analogies (Brown, 1989; Goswami, 1991).  
Socio-cultural aspects. It is important, when using analogies, to acknowledge the 
cultural and social context of prior experience. Most models depict analogical reasoning 
as an individual, internal process, and miss the possibilities associated with input from 
the contextual group. Teachers and parents use analogies naturally when working with 
children. Most tend to use analogies that would include a source or base that is familiar to 
the child, and it is important to consider what background knowledge the child has. 
Analogical reasoning can be mediated by the social group as well as by the cultural 
background of a learner (Valle & Callanan, 2006). 
33 
Instructional Tools 
Types of Analogies 
When studying how analogies are used for instruction, the variety of analogies is 
problematic. It is necessary to identify which type of analogy is being used and the 
purposes for using the analogies. To classify analogies, I divide them into four types: 
naturalistic, reading, classical, and instructional analogies. In this section, each type is 
described, along with the purposes for which it is used, and examples are provided from 
analogy research. The research examples are not exhaustive; rather, they were chosen to 
be typical of the way research has been conducted on each type of analogy. Because of a 
specific interest in analogies used in science education, the instructional analogies group 
is given more attention than the other types, with no apology for the unbalanced 
treatment.  
Classification schemes. Other classification schemes for analogies exist in the 
literature; these are based on each researcher’s purpose and specific research problems. 
For example, Gentner (1983) classified comparisons along a continuum from literal 
similarity, in which there is an exact match between features and relationships, through 
anomaly, in which there is no match between features or relationships. Gentner was 
studying the mapping or comparing that happens when considering two concepts, objects, 
or systems, so this type of classification was needed. Other researchers approached 
analogies from a naturalistic perspective of how they are used in science classrooms. 
With no explanation given for the classification system used, Dagher and Crossman 
(1992) identified ten types of explanations, including analogies. Later, focusing just on 
analogies, Dagher (1995b) distinguished:  (a) compound analogies, using more than one 
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source; (b) narrative analogies which were very storylike; (c) procedural analogies, 
giving instructions for accomplishing something; (d) peripheral analogies, as the teacher 
elaborated; and (e) simple analogies, which needed further development. At the same 
time, she pointed out that the domain in which she worked influenced the descriptions of 
analogies.  
The most extensive classification systems for analogies appear in analyses of 
science textbooks. In these analyses and other studies, analogies are classified by their 
structure and components, such as being extended or elaborate (Glynn & Takahasi, 1998; 
Orgill & Bodner, 2006; Paris & Glynn, 2004; Zheng et al., 2008), auditory or text-based 
(Markman, Taylor, & Gentner, 2007), using surface features or structural relationships 
(Gentner & Kurtz, 2006; Nokes & Ross, 2007; Richland et al., 2004), difficulty level 
(Roccas & Moshinsky, 2003), and various degrees of abstractness (Curtis & Reigeluth, 
1984; Newton, 2003; Orgill & Bodner, 2006). Analogies have also been classified as to 
whether they are student or teacher centered (Oliva, Azcarate, & Navarrete, 2007; 
Richland et al., 2004). None of these classifications, however, exploit the purposes for 
which the analogies studied were made, a key feature of studying efficacy. Richland et al. 
(2004) identified four mathematics goals for the analogies they studied. Their goals of 
“being a math student,” “concepts only,” “concepts and procedures,” and “procedures 
only” (p. 45) are so specific to the mathematics classroom that they are not useful for 
classifying the wide variety of analogies. Holyoak (2005) divides the research related to 
analogies into the “psychometric tradition” (p. 118), the study of metaphor, and 
“knowledge representation” (p. 12 a). His classification system introduces a tangent, with 
the study of metaphor, leaving two categories of analogies.  
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None of these previously used classifications were appropriate for this study. I 
chose to examine four purposes for analogies in general and use those purposes to 
delineate four types of analogies.  
Naturalistic Analogies 
Description of naturalistic analogies. Humans seem to use analogies naturally 
and frequently. “Hardly a day elapses without encountering one—either in print (from 
Plato to Einstein to Agatha Christie) or in everyday spoken language” (Curtis & 
Reigeluth, 1984, p. 99). Very young children use spontaneous analogies (Gentner, 1988), 
and research with children has led more than one researcher to suggest that analogical 
reasoning may be tied to development as children create mental models that are 
analogous to the world (Goswami, 1991; Vosniadou, 1995). Holyoak (2005) provides 
examples of the use of analogies in scientific endeavors, mathematics, law, and public 
policy. 
Naturalistic analogies are sociocultural in nature. Some analogies have become 
entrenched in a particular culture, at which point they are used as metaphors. The word 
“fire” probably was used in analogies mapped to such concepts as knowledge, love, and 
envy and is now part of our metaphoric vocabulary (Gentner et al., 2001). The 
sociocultural nature of naturalistic analogies is important to remember; we can make a 
mistake in assuming that shared understanding exists when it may not. 
Purposes of naturalistic analogies. In many aspects of our lives, analogies are 
used to clarify and put into words a concept (Dagher, 1995a). Parents and caregivers 
naturally use analogies for explaining concepts or events. A benefit of this is that children 
become encultured to see analogies as an accepted form of communication (Valle & 
36 
Callanan, 2006). Analogies are also used for predicting future situations, based on past 
events (May et al., 2006). We use analogies for describing both abstract and concrete 
concepts, we provide fables and parables as warnings, we use analogies as literary 
devices, we use analogies for efficient communication, and we use past experiences as 
the basis for making decisions. All of these are analogous situations, in the broadest sense 
of the term.  
 While “naturalistic analogies” may not be a sophisticated label, there are some 
very sophisticated uses of analogies in the everyday world. In scientific communities, in 
particular, “analogical thinking is a key component of all aspects of scientific reasoning, 
ranging from hypothesis generation to experimental design, data interpretation, and 
explanations” (Dunbar, 2001, p. 315). Scientists use analogies for discovery, 
experimentation, explanations, and evaluation of explanations. Many creative discoveries 
have been made through analogical reasoning, including the invention of Velcro®, that 
lightning behaves like other electricity, the ring structure of benzene, and even the mind 
as a computer so popular in cognitive science (Holyoak & Thagard, 1995). 
Scientific work obviously involves learning; it could easily be argued that the 
natural analogies used by scientists could be classified with my fourth group, 
instructional analogies. This is an admittedly personal distinction; my research interests 
focus on science education, so it is important to group together the research that provides 
evidence for how children learn through analogies. 
Examples of research involving naturalistic analogies. Dunbar and his 
colleagues have studied scientists in their work environment for many years, 
documenting laboratory work and planning meetings as well as interviewing scientists. 
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Simultaneously, they did controlled tests on aspects of scientific thinking. While the 
purpose of these studies was to describe how scientific endeavors unfold, Dunbar points 
out a large discrepancy between how analogies are generated in naturalistic settings and 
how they are used and generated under controlled research settings. He points out that 
research can remove the many other important factors that work alongside analogical 
reasoning in scientific work. Natural processes, such as elaborate encoding and goal-
setting, may not serve their purposes for learning (Dunbar, 2001).  
Valle and Callanan (2006) found analogies often used in parent and child 
conversations. While visiting science museum exhibits, parents pointed out analogies, 
using sources they thought would be familiar or of interest to their children. While 
helping with homework, parents followed the same patterns. In both situations, parents 
used analogies that used relational similarities and explicitly mapped the relationships for 
their children. After the homework assignment, a positive relationship was found 
between parents providing analogies to explain and their children’s understanding of the 
concepts.  
Other important aspects of naturalistic analogical reasoning in children have been 
discovered through research. First of all, by third grade, many children exhibit the same 
uses for spontaneous analogies that experts within a domain do. They naturally use 
analogies for predicting and explaining (May et al., 2006). Goswami’s studies of children 
using analogies led her to suggest that there may be a developmental change from 
perceptual use of analogy, starting in infancy, to a conceptual use as children mature 
(2001). Gentner (1988) found evidence for a relational shift, or point in a child’s 
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development where analogical reasoning shifts from comparing surface features to 
seeking out the underlying relationships or roles. 
Analogies are an accepted part of our everyday lives. We use them in so many 
different ways, from cultural icons to scientific insight, that it would be difficult to 
catalog naturalistic analogies completely. Analogies permeate our thoughts so completely 
that it is accepted by many researchers that analogical reasoning is an important aspect of 
cognition. At the far extreme is the view that “every concept we have is essentially 
nothing but a tightly packaged bundle of analogies” as we chunk information and go 
through life comparing new information to existing (Hofstadter, 2001, p. 300). 
Reading Analogies 
Description of reading analogies. At the basic phonemic level, words consist of 
sounds, corresponding to letters or groups of letters. The next higher level is the syllabic 
level, where there is a beginning sound (onset) and middle and ending sounds (rime). A 
reading analogy, also call a rime analogy or orthographic analogy, is the mapping of an 
onset and rime onto an unknown word. For example, the word “beak” maps to the word 
“peak.” These rime analogies are more common than onset analogies, such as “bean” 
mapping to “beak” (Ehri, Satlow, & Gaskins, 2009; Goswami, 1991; Wood, 2000). 
Purposes of reading analogies. During the process of learning to read, children 
must develop phonological awareness and be able to look at the component phonemes in 
words. Orthographic analogies let early readers use a known word to read an unknown 
word, promoting word recognition, important to reading development (Kamhi & Laing, 
2000; Wood, 2000). Synthetic phonics instruction has the children sound out each 
phoneme and then blend them together; analogies, however, teach children to use what 
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they have already learned for parts of the words (Erhi et al., 2009). Reading analogies 
are, therefore, helpful when to learning to read (Farrington-Flint, Wood, Canobi, & 
Faulkner, 2004). 
Examples of research about reading analogies. Much of the research on the 
orthographic analogies has been based on the debate over whether students should learn 
to read in whole language or explicit phonics programs. Out of this has come a divide 
about the importance and efficacy of using orthographic analogies; the sound structure 
(phonological priming) may be used, rather than the physical similarities of the words. 
There is disagreement about the size of the phonological units used by students and at 
what point in their reading development these units are important (Roberts & McDougall, 
2003). Wood and colleagues (Wood, 2000) gave children a battery of tests and then 
analyzed the results, with multiple regression analyses, to determine the contributions of 
different factors on reading scores. Orthographic analogy was associated with the largest 
variance. Rime detection was associated with using orthographic analogies, but so was 
reading experience and phonemic awareness. This study provided more evidence that 
orthographic analogies are an important part of learning to read. 
Walton and Walton (2002) addressed the question of how rime analogy develops 
in the very first stages of reading, by experimentally isolating rime analogy strategies 
from other pre-reading strategies. They found a relationship between rime analogy 
instruction and phonemic skills needed for reading instruction. They found that children 
were able to generalize rime analogy use to rimes they had not seen before. In addition, 
many of the children naturally developed skills in rhyming, initial phoneme recognition 
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and matching of letters and sounds. They propose that rime analogy is worthwhile for 
children in the very first stages of learning to read. 
On the other hand, Roberts and McDougall (2003) experimented to tease apart the 
phonological, phonological and orthographical, and orthographical analogies with 
beginning readers. They found that students used phonological units, or rhymes, rather 
than looking at the word as an onset and rime, analogous to a new word. Children were 
very good at using every phoneme in the words and blending them to understand the 
words. They concluded that students actually use a variety of strategies, and that these 
vary from instance to instance and context to context. 
Classical Analogies 
Description of classical analogies. The classical form of an analogy is to notate 
that A is to B as C is to D, often written A:B::C:D. This notation indicates that D is 
related to C in the same way that B is related to A (Holyoak, 2005). An example of a 
classical analogy is bird:nest::human:house. The relationship between a bird and a nest is 
the same relationship as that between a person and a house, the relationship of residing. 
The same relationship can be shown as predicates (Gentner, 1983, 1989): OCCUPY 
(human, house) and OCCUPY (bird, nest). A classical format can be used with an 
arithmetic analogy, such as 4:8::3:6 or can take the form of pictures rather than words. 
Work with children, for example, often requires them to look at Pictures A and B, then 
find a picture that shows the same relationship with Picture C. For example, a picture of 
handlebars and a picture of a tricycle would have the same relationship as a picture of a 
steering wheel and a picture of a car. The classical form can also be used with stories and 
fables (Gentner et al., 2003), proverbs (Markman et al., 2007), and models (Gentner, 
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1988; Loewenstein & Gentner, 2001). The important distinction is that the relationship 
between the first pair is the same as the relationship between the second pair. This 
structure of classical analogies makes them distinct and precludes any need for surface 
similarities. It is actually difficult to think of attributional similarities between a nest and 
a house; the similarity is in the relationship with the occupant.  
Another important feature of classical analogies is that both pairs are familiar, 
distinctly different from analogies in which there is a known base or source and a less 
familiar or to be learned target. While classical analogies most often use higher-order 
relationships that require understanding of relationships among relationships, such as 
cause and effect (Gentner, 1988; Holyoak, 2005), there are usually fewer mappings 
needed (Collins & Burstein, 1989).  
Purposes of classical analogies. The relationship mapping required in classical 
analogies is useful in measuring intellectual capability. Classical analogies have 
traditionally been used on intelligence tests and the positive correlation between 
analogical reasoning, using classical analogies, and measures of intelligence, has been 
well documented (Goswami, 2001; Holyoak, 2005). A classical analogy measures more 
than vocabulary as it requires one to understand the relationship between the pairs.  
Classical analogies have often been used and validated for ranking intelligence 
and predicting success in academic fields. Research has been conducted on the cognitive 
processes involved and how individuals differ in solving (Roccas & Moshinsky, 2003). 
Until 2005, the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) for college entrance had an analogies 
section (Cohen, 2005). 
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The Raven’s Progressive Matrices Test is an example of the classical form of 
analogy. It uses geometric shapes and the subject must determine the visiospatial 
relationships; the RPM is a good measure of g as described by Spearman. The RPM 
requires more mappings than other classical forms of analogies. To solve it, the subject 
must be able to map relationships between size, color, and shape, often in the same 
analogy, and the relationship can take the form of a progression (Cianciolo & Sternberg, 
2004; Jaarsveld, Lachmann, Hamel, & van Leeuwen, 2010).  
Classical analogies have been used for a great deal of research about analogical 
thinking, also. Most of Gentner’s work on structural mapping, which sets out the 
conditions and parameters for mapping relationships, was done using classical analogy 
structures (Gentner, 1983, 1988; Gentner & Kurtz, 2006; Kurtz et al., 2001). Studies on 
development of analogical reasoning in children have also used the classical format, often 
with pictures or models (Goswami, 2001; Loewenstein & Gentner, 2001; Vosniadou, 
1995). 
Classical analogies can also be used for learning. If given two different situations, 
the underlying principle or relationship can be figured out. This has been shown to help 
students understand causal relationships especially (Kurtz et al., 2001; Mason, 2004). I 
chose to classify this use as a classical analogy because the examples being compared are 
both known to the learners or at least enough is known about them both that the relating 
principle can be found.  
Most computational models of analogy use a classical format. During the 1980s, 
Gentner and her colleagues developed the Structure Mapping Engine (SME), which can 
map the relationships between two concepts (Forbus & Gentner, 1989; Gentner, 1983, 
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1989). The Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine (ACME) was developed to include 
constraints on the amount that can be processed at one time (Holyoak & Thagard, 1989). 
The Connectionist Analogy Builder (CAB) also included constraints analogous to 
working memory (Larkey & Love, 2003), as does the Learning and Inference with 
Schemas and Analogies (LISA) model, which uses semantically based representational 
networks (Holyoak & Hummel, 2001).  
Examples of research using classical analogies. Much of what we know about 
analogical reasoning has been learned with the use of classical analogies; fewer mappings 
in the classical format make the basis for research more doable (Holyoak, 2005). We 
usually rely on Gentner’s structure mapping theory to describe the rules of analogical 
reasoning. This theory includes the primacy of relationships over attributes and the 
dominance of higher-order relationships in mapping (Gentner, 1983). We know from 
research that people tend to make a one-to-one mapping correspondence between the 
base and the target based on roles of the attributes. People also prefer to map systems of 
relationships, rather than isolated features, when carrying information from one side of an 
analogy to the other. When subjects wrote out descriptions of objects and then had to 
interpret analogical comparisons containing those objects, the descriptions contained 
attributes while the interpretations were based on relationships (Gentner, 1989). Children 
were asked to transfer a story to different characters. When the story had a systematic 
structure of underlying relationships, children were better able to transfer the story to 
cross-mapped characters (Gentner & Toupin, 1986). Cross-mapped characters are those 
that do not share attributional or surface features. For example, a chipmunk and a squirrel 
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would share many surface features; a chipmunk and a fish would not. Researchers found 
that older children were less reliant on the surface features. 
Using classical analogies, Roccas and Moshinsky (2003) teased apart the features 
that contribute to the difficulty of analogies. They looked the contribution of the 
knowledge components (word rarity and whether the analogy can be understood with the 
inherent meaning in the words or needs outside information) and the process components 
(negativity in the relation, order of the words (natural or not), and direct or indirect 
relations). These components in 104 analogies were rated by expert judges. The rarity of 
the words, the inherent meaning, negativity in the relation, and order of the words 
contributed to the analogy difficulty; together they explain a small but significant part of 
the variance of item difficulty. They concluded that analogies measure, at least in part, 
cognitive ability, not just knowledge. Student cognitive ability, however, has seldom then 
been considered in studies of analogy use. 
In an attempt to better understand working memory, Tohill and Holyoak (2000) 
studied how analogical performance would be affected by an induced state of anxiety. 
They hypothesized that increased anxiety would tax working memory capacity and lead 
to a decrease in relational mappings and an increase in attribute mappings. They used 
cross-mapped pictures, so that the same object takes on a different role in a second 
picture, and had participants answer questions about the cross-mapped pictures. They 
found that “anxiety led to a systematic shift from relation-based to attribute-based 
responses” (p. 37) even when subjects were asked to specifically find relationships. This 
provides evidence that analogies require cognitive resources, which are limited by the 
capacity of working memory. 
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Instructional Analogies  
It should be obvious that many types of analogies are used in learning situations. 
However, there are times, especially in a K-12 setting, that analogies are specifically used 
to teach concepts. These are the analogies I classify as “instructional analogies.” 
Description of instructional analogies. There are three features which 
distinguish instructional analogies from other types. First, instructional analogies use a 
base, analog, or source which is already familiar to the learners. Known information 
about the base is then transferred as inferences to a less well-understood concept, the 
target (Clement & Gentner, 1988; Davies, Nersessian, & Goel, 2005). This further 
explains the importance of underlying relationships over surface features (e.g., Gentner & 
Kurtz, 2006; Kurtz et al., 2001; Mason, 2004). The surface features of the base are not 
what teachers want transferred to the lesser known target. Children, as they mature, must 
actually be able to inhibit the tendency to compare surface features if they are going to 
reason analogically (Richland et al., 2006). For example, when a teacher successfully 
presents a city as an analog for an ecological community, the physical features of city 
components such as streets, buildings, merchants, and customers are not used in making 
inferences about the ecological community. Rather, the roles of the infrastructure, shelter, 
consumers and producers transfer to the appropriate components of the ecological 
community. This means that the roles of streets are mapped to pathways, the purposes of 
buildings are mapped to shelter, the work of merchants or manufacturers is mapped to 
producers, and the role of customers is mapped to consumers. 
Several researchers have found evidence of how important previous knowledge of 
the source is (Curtis & Reigeluth, 1984; Dagher, 1995a; Glynn, 1991; Thagard, 1992). 
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This feature of instructional analogies can also be a danger. A community or group shares 
a tacit background of accepted knowledge. Teachers, as part of their professional 
community, have much different understandings than their students, and individual 
students may have very different conceptions than the group’s. A teacher cannot assume 
that all children have a uniform understanding of the source and must keep in mind that 
all representations are unique to a person and a time (Duit et al., 2001; Markman & 
Gentner, 2000; Thiele & Treagust, 1994). In interviews with textbook authors, Thiele and 
Treagust found they expected that teachers would make sure that students understood the 
bases used. Orgill and Bodner (2006) point out that there is little evidence that this 
happens in classrooms. It should also be noted, though, that learning has been 
documented when two partially understood phenomena are used analogously (Brown & 
Clement, 1989; Clement, 1993; Kurtz et al., 2001; Mason, 2004). 
Often the base is more familiar than the target in the sense that it is more concrete 
(Bryce & MacMillan, 2005; Dagher, 1995a; Glynn, 2008; Heywood, 2002; Hutchison & 
Padgett, 2007). Studies of analogies presented in science textbooks show that this appears 
to be important in science education. In most studies, the majority of the analogies 
mapped a concrete base onto an abstract concept. For example, the inner workings of a 
cell are very abstract for children. Teachers often provide a concrete source, such as a 
town or a factory, to help their students understand the functions of cell components. The 
proportion of concrete bases varies, though, with the grade level and subject matter 
(Table 1). 
The importance of the mapping between familiar and unknown or from concrete 
to abstract is critical for the second feature of instructional analogies. They provide a re-
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organization of knowledge to integrate the new information and facilitate access and 
retrieval of knowledge from memory (Chiu & Lin, 2005; Duit et al., 2001; Flick, 1991; 
Glynn, 1991; Glynn & Takahashi, 1998; Kokinov & Petrov, 2001; Kurtz et al., 2001; 
Mason, 2004). Evidence suggests that instructional analogies are helpful because students 
can build mental representations (Blake, 2004; Coll, France, & Taylor, 2005; Davies et 
al., 2005), and they may provide elaboration though the redundancy of the mapped 
proposition, especially in the deeper relational structures and the constant back and forth 
between old and new information (Duit et al.; Paris & Glynn, 2004). 
Table 1 
Percentage of Concrete-to-Abstract Mappings in Science Textbooks 
Level Content % Concrete to 
Abstract Analogies 
Elementary All sciences 40%a - 82%b 
Secondary Chemistry 87%c 
Secondary Biology 62%d 
Post-secondary Biochemistry >90%e 
a Newton, 2003 
b Curtis & Reigeluth, 1984 
c Thiele & Treagust, 1994 
d Thiele et al., 1995 
e Orgill & Bodner, 2006 
The final feature of instructional analogies is that they usually involve more than 
single words or short phrases. Recall that classical analogies are often simply sets of 
words, such as “steering wheel is to car as handlebars are to tricycle.” Instructional 
analogies, however, because they are transferring the relationships and roles from a base 
to a target, usually are more lengthy (Glynn, 2008) and, in fact, much research has been 
done on how much detail is needed in instructional analogies (e.g., Glynn, 2008; Glynn, 
Taasoobshirazi, & Fowler, 2007; Glynn & Takahashi, 1998; Klein et al., 2007; Paris & 
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Glynn, 2004; Trey & Khan, 2008; Zheng et al., 2008, as well as the previously discussed 
textbook analyses).  
Not all instructional analogies are detailed. Some have actually become so 
entrenched that it is possible the analogy has actually become the meaning for some 
students (Heywood, 2002; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995). Some concepts rely on analogies 
to the point that they are almost always described in terms of their analogies. 
Descriptions of subatomic particles moving are, for example, are difficult to even 
imagine without a solar system model. Analogies become so common in certain subjects 
that their use is not only expected but ubiquitous (Orgill & Bodner, 2006; Venville & 
Donovan, 2006). Electrical current, for example, is referred to as flowing, even when a 
water movement analogical source is not being consciously invoked.  
Purposes of instructional analogies. Instructional analogies have been used for a 
multitude of purposes, including conceptual change or ontological shifts in knowledge, 
problem solving, and persuasion. I chose the label “instructional analogies” because these 
analogies are all used in the learning of something, or, in the case of persuasive analogies, 
in a change of behavior based on information. In short, they serve as scaffolding for 
learning, which may be helpful to different degrees for different students. 
Dagher, Thiele, Treagust, and Duit (1993) point out that the purpose of science 
education is not to repair students’ concepts, but to move them towards more canonical 
understanding. In science education, it is common to discuss the goal of conceptual 
change. Researchers have argued long about what constitutes conceptual change (e.g., 
Dole & Sinatra, 1998; Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982) and what actually 
changes. Vosniadou and her colleagues describe cohesive, generative, and explanatory 
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naïve theories, which qualitatively change to align with scientifically accepted 
explanations (Vosniadou, 1994, 2007; Vosniadou & Ioannides, 1998). An opposing view 
is that naïve concepts are disconnected and need to be organized in alignment with 
scientifically accepted explanations (diSessa, 1998). Chi suggested that conceptual 
change is a process of ontological shifting in understanding (Chi, 1992; Chi, Slotta, & 
DeLeeuw, 1994). It is beyond the scope of this literature review to analyze the evidence 
for each. Suffice it to say, a major purpose of analogy use in science education is for 
some form of conceptual change or increased content knowledge (Chiu & Lin, 2005; 
Dagher et al., 1993; Duit, 1991; Glynn, 1996; Glynn & Takahashi, 1998; Heywood, 
2002; Orgill & Bodner, 2006; Vosniadou, 2007; Zheng et al., 2008). Vosniadou states 
that, because of the mappings and transfer that happens, “analogical reasoning [is] a 
central mechanism in cognitive development and in knowledge acquisition” (1995, p. 
298).  
In using instructional analogies for learning new concepts, the base is usually 
given to students, rather than retrieved as Holyoak (2005) describes in his model of 
analogical reasoning. This is distinctly different from using analogies for problem 
solving. Problem solving with analogies requires conceptualizing the target problem, 
retrieving the correct source based on relational or deep structures, and transferring the 
base solution to the target problem (Gamo, Sander, & Richards, 2010; Kokinov & Petrov, 
2001). Experts in a domain are known for being able to use analogies when solving 
problems, usually spontaneously (Clement, 1988, 1998). In problem-solving, there is a 
search through the problem space for ways to reach the goal state (Mayer, 1992). In 
50 
successful analogical problem solving, this search often produces retrieval of a previous 
solution that fits the constraints of the novel situation.  
The seminal example of analogical problem solving is the Gick and Holyoak 
(1980, 1983) series of studies on whether subjects could use a solution in a story (troops 
converging from different directions on a site) to solve an analogous problem (the need 
for radiation convergence on a tumor). Retrieval of the analogous solution was poor; 
subjects needed hints about using the analogous story or the opportunity to solve the first 
story problem for themselves.  
Since this study, researchers have shown that problem solving can benefit from 
making the relationships more salient (Gentner & Kurtz, 2006), comparing a variety of 
base solutions (Gamo et al., 2010; Gentner et al., 2003), using a procedure in a variety of 
contexts (Novick & Hmelo, 1994; Sandifer, 2004), connecting solutions conceptually 
(Clement, 1998), and having strong retrieval cues (Richland & McDonough, 2010).  
A particular type of problem-solving using analogies is known as case-based 
reasoning (CBR). In business, law, and medicine, it is common to teach through the use 
of cases which highlight the underlying structure of the situation or problem. The 
students are then expected to transfer the answer or solution from one case to a novel 
situation (Gentner et al., 2003; Kolodner, 1997; 2002a; 2002b).  
A final purpose of instructional analogies focuses on persuasion, a slightly 
different goal than learning or problem-solving; however, a change in the organization of 
information or change in behavior based on that information is being sought. Analogies 
are used to frame politics, policy making, choices, and advertising (Dunbar, 2001; 
Holyoak, 2005; Markman & Moreau, 2001). Framing has powerful effects on the choices 
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people make (see Stanovich, 2010 for a good overview). Markman and Moreau use the 
example of the domino analogy used to frame the need for American intervention during 
the Cold War. Most people were familiar with the idea of a standing trail of dominoes; 
when one goes over, it starts a chain of falling dominoes. As countries “fell” to 
communism, the fear was planted that more and more countries would follow. As people 
make choices, analogies could actually frame the consideration sets from which they 
make decisions, although there is not yet empirical evidence for this.  
With the emphasis on assessment in the world of education, a fourth purpose for 
instructional analogies could be proposed, that of evaluation. Generation of an analogy 
involving a concept, requiring students to provide a detailed mapping, could possibly be 
used to assess students’ conceptual framework. For example, after a lesson on taxonomic 
classification, students could be asked to develop analogies for the hierarchical system. If 
students were required to map the relational structures, the teacher could gain insight into 
how the students organized the information (Chin, Brown, & Bruce, 2002; Sandifer, 
2004). Further research is needed of the efficacy of using analogies in both summative 
and formative assessments.  
Examples of research about instructional analogies. Much research has been 
done on how analogies can be “pedagogically effective,” to use Glynn and Takahashi’s 
phrase (1998, p. 113). Chiu and Lin (2005) did a study with fourth-grade students, not 
only to see if presenting an analogy helped them learn the basic concepts of electricity, 
but to tease out whether the learning was an ontological shift or conceptual change. They 
had four conditions: single analogy, similar analogies, complementary analogies, and no 
analogies (control). All of the groups outperformed the control group, and the 
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complementary analogies group was significantly different than the others. They 
reasoned that the interventions that provided multiple perspectives were most effective. 
They also found that students expressed predicates that could be classified as matter, 
processes, and mental states (Chi et al., 1994), before and after the intervention. The 
complementary analogies group was the only one that statistically demonstrated a 
difference in ontology, moving towards more process predicates. In other words, they 
provided evidence for children learning about electricity through the use of analogies, as 
well as evidence of small ontological shifts. 
Some of the most interesting studies of analogies have been done in physics, 
using experts. Clement (1998) used a series of case studies to determine how experts use 
analogies in solving problems. The subjects were experts in domains that require problem 
solving, advanced doctoral students and professors in technical fields, but not experts, per 
se, in the fields for the problems they were given. He found that those with expertise in 
problem solving used four steps, although not always in a particular order:  (a) generate a 
tentative analogous relation; (b) judge the aptness or appropriateness of the analogy; (c) 
examine the known half of the analogy; and (d) transfer conclusions, principles, or 
procedures from the known analog to the problem. The experts retrieved or generated 
analogs based on structural relationships or underlying principles, rather than surface 
features. They also spent an inordinate amount of their problem solving time on 
questioning and judging the aptness of the analogy before they used it. Clement points 
out that this is counterintuitive to the commonly held view that analogies are shortcuts for 
instruction because they present a system of relationships in one representation. Clement 
discusses how this fits in with his work on bridging analogies, in which students move 
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through a series of analogies to a more scientific understanding, and he provides evidence 
of the efficacy of this approach.  
Dunbar (2001) and his colleagues did extensive qualitative studies of persuasive 
analogy use in politics, specifically during a referendum on Quebec independence in 
1996. They analyzed politicians’ and journalists’ analogies in newspapers, over 200 
analogies in 400 articles in the last week before the referendum vote. They classified the 
targets and bases semantically, rated the emotional connotations of the bases, and 
determined whether the targets and bases were from closely related or distant domains. 
Analogies were used by the politicians and journalist both to argue for a side and to point 
out dangers of the other side. The targets and based were from such diverse categories as 
farming, athletic competition, and religion. Most of the sources used by politicians were 
highly emotional, and positive emotion was invoked for their side and negative emotion 
invoked by analogies used to argue against their stance.  
Analogies: Complex Learning Opportunities 
In summary, analogical reasoning is a group of complex, non-linear, cognitively 
taxing processes, rather than a single skill. Dunbar concluded that “analogy is much more 
than a mechanistic thought process” (2001, p. 32). We know how critical previous 
knowledge is for learning. Humans store and organize information in long-term memory, 
and that information is used for further learning. From a cognitive orientation, analogies 
are specifically designed to allow students to bring their organized network of prior 
knowledge to a new concept and perform several functions. 
First, analogies activate schemata relevant to new information. Activation of a 
chunk of related information is efficient. In addition, by using an analogy, the teacher can 
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direct what is used for background knowledge. Second, an analogy provides an 
organizational system for new information. It allows already strong, meaningful 
connections to be tied to new information or to assist with changing misconceptions. 
Third, analogies can provide mental models that connect abstract principles or un-
experienced processes to more concrete, meaningful schemata. So much of what we do in 
science education is abstract or invisible. Models become critically important as children 
move towards scientific understanding. Fourth, using analogies provides an elaboration 
strategy. If students can carefully map from the source to the target, they will experience 
deeper processing, which we know leads to stronger learning gains. Analogies can 
provide the keys to unlocking treasure chests of previous knowledge that can promote 
learning. 
Guided Instruction is Valuable 
This study rests on the value of guided instruction. There continues to be a debate 
in the science education world about the roles of explicit or direct instruction and 
discovery learning, often under various labels (Duit et al., 2001; Swaak, deJong, & van 
Joolingen, 2004). Over the years, a division has emerged between those who advocate for 
guided or direct instruction and those who advocate for unguided or discovery learning. 
The argument put forth in support of guided instruction  is based on: (a) our knowledge 
of the limits of working memory and the importance of knowledge organized in long-
term memory, as the goal of most instruction is to enable learners to store and retrieve 
information in a given situation; (b) the warrant that accurate mental representation of 
concepts requires complete and accurate information, not what a student may or may not 
misrepresent; and (c) empirical evidence for guided instruction (Kirschner, Sweller, & 
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Clark, 2006). Mayer (2004) points out that, regardless of the lack of supporting empirical 
evidence, “discovery has been replayed” about every decade (p. 18). Hmelo-Silver, 
Duncan, & Chinn (2007) agree “there is little evidence to suggest that unguided and 
experientially-based approaches foster learning” (p. 100). Other researchers have shown 
that explicit instruction can be efficient, effective, and engaging for students (Coll, 2006; 
Hudson, Miller, & Butler, 2006; Knight, 2002; Spada & Tomita, 2010). 
Specifically studying analogies, Harrison and Treagust (2000) found that 
structured and scaffolded instruction about mental models helped students acquire 
accurate visualizations when teachers taught specific strategies and skills and provided 
time for critiquing the analogies and models. Other researchers, too, have called for 
guided instruction about the strategies involved with analogy used (Klauer, 1989; 
Thagard, 1992; Zook, 1993). Guided instruction has been found helpful for other 
strategies. Nussbaum, Sinatra, and Poliquin (2008) were able to show the effectiveness of 
teaching about the structure and nature of scientific arguments before students engaged in 
scientific argumentation. I suggest that teaching about the nature and use of analogies 
may be a similarly beneficial strategy for helping students use these tools effectively.  
Scaffolds. In science education, strategies used in guided instruction are often 
referred to as scaffolding. As Losh and Nzekwe (2011) point out, it is assumed teachers 
will provide scaffolds for students. The term “scaffolding” was originally used in the 
study of language acquisition in infants (Woods, Bruner, & Ross, 1976), and the 
construct gained popularity during a time when Vygotsky’s work was influential. 
Currently, it refers to anything that is provided or enabled to allow students to accomplish 
something beyond their capacities. “Scaffold” can be a noun, referring to something 
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provided, or a verb, referring to a process or behavior. It can be informal and naturalistic, 
such as the interactions between mother and child, or formalized and strategic, such as 
learning materials or analogies (Pea, 2004).  
Scaffolding is thought to be valuable for a number of reasons. One of the values 
of scaffolding is that it can provide models of how experts think and the strategies they 
use (Caliskan et al., 2010). Scaffolding may help decrease the cognitive load on working 
memory (Salden et al., 2009). It can help learners see the relevant components of the 
task, model strategies, and assist with mental representation of concepts (Davis & 
Miyake, 2004), as well as direct attention where it is needed (Duit, 1991). This may be 
especially helpful in conjunction with textbooks, which usually provide analogies but 
assume the learner has the skills for using them (Thiele & Treagust, 1994; Thiele et al., 
1995; Venville & Treagust, 1997).  
Examples of scaffolds. Scaffolds can be as simple as hints and cognitive prompts 
or as complex as diagrammatic representations and computer programs that help students 
organize and visualize their thinking (Bell & Linn, 2000; Sinatra & Chinn, 2011). 
Scaffolding can consist of guidance, challenging students towards deeper thinking, 
modeling, coaching, and questioning (Hmelo-Silver et al., 2007). Scaffolds tend to fall 
into two categories, “channeling and focusing” or “modeling” (Pea, 2004, p. 432). 
Teachers can provide hints that help students narrow down where information can be 
found. Often, students are encouraged to use a heuristic or note-taking system as a 
scaffold; the notes become hints or organizational tools for information. Textbooks, too, 
often provide scaffolds that channel and focus attention. They are often organized with 
headings, bold type, guiding questions, and definitions to help students use the tool 
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effectively. Teachers model procedures, safety practices, and study skills, as they teach, 
fading out the guidance over time to promote self-regulation and student growth.   
Analogies can actually serve as the scaffolds for learning (Chiu & Lin, 2005; 
Holyoak, 2005). Science education and professional science contexts are filled with 
analogy use (Oliva et al., 2007; Treagust, 2007; Valle & Callanan, 2006). The research 
on the effectiveness of analogies used for learning should inform the use of these 
scaffolds. 
Previous Research on Analogy Use for Learning 
 From a cognitive orientation, there is a great deal of useful research on the 
effectiveness of analogies for instruction. Three types of research helped shape the 
current research project. First, qualitative or observational studies provide evidence of the 
frequent use of analogies in science education and describe the wide variety of ways in 
which they are used. Second, there is qualitative evidence that learning or conceptual 
change can be related to analogy use. Finally, some classroom models for analogy use 
have been suggested in the literature.  
Qualitative or Observational Studies 
 Of the wide variety of observational studies, those described here provide 
evidence of how analogies seem to be used naturally and intuitively. Observational 
studies also provide a glimpse into differences between novices and experts using 
analogies and how classroom use varies culturally. 
Analogy Use in Classrooms. 
 Students. Much as in the museum study of parents interacting with their children 
(Valle & Callanan, 2006), described above in the section on naturalistic analogies, 
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students in classrooms naturally use analogies. Paatz et al. (2004) did a detailed study of 
student learning during extended instruction with analogies. By detailing the interactions 
of 16-year-old German students, they found that students enjoyed using analogies. 
Focusing on a particular student with interviews, they documented her movement over 
time towards more scientific vocabulary and her natural use of higher order relationships 
over physical features. They found evidence of inferencing between source and target. 
They also found, however, that their focus student carried some misconceptions to the 
target and that not all of her classmates used the same strategies during the series of 
analogies. 
 Teachers. Other observational studies inform us that teachers may not understand 
analogies well or carefully plan their use. Over the course of 40 lessons, seven high 
school science teachers were observed and then interviewed. The teachers thought they 
had used analogies more frequently than they actually did and had trouble distinguishing 
analogies from examples (Treagust, Duit, Joslin, & Lindauer, 1992). In a followup study 
of four Australian chemistry teachers, Thiele and Treagust (1994) looked for evidence of 
why teacher chose analogies, where they chose them from, and the characteristics of 
those analogies. The researchers identified seven themes that emerged from the 
observations: 
1. Analogies were used most often when teachers thought students did not 
understand an explanation because the students asked questions, responded to the 
teacher incorrectly, or otherwise indicated misunderstanding. 
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2. Analogies were seldom planned by the teachers and were used spontaneously. 
Each teacher described a personal mental collection from which analogies were 
retrieved in response to student needs. 
3. Analogies came from the teachers’ experiences and professional reading. They 
seldom elaborated on the textbook-supplied analogies. Even in many instances 
when student experiences could have been used, teachers used their own 
experiences.  
4. Analogies were often supplemented with diagrams or pictures, drawn by the 
teachers. One teacher mentioned that this actually helped her describe what she 
was picturing. 
5. Mapping from source to target varied. When analogies were simple and not 
elaborated upon, there was little mapping. When analogies were more complex, 
usually one feature was mapped. If teachers felt there were several concepts that 
could be drawn from the source, they mapped more. 
6. Teachers wanted to ensure that students understood the source. However, there 
were many instances when the teachers thought the students understood the 
sources and they did not. 
7. There were few instances of the teachers pointing out where the analogies broke 
down. 
In a widely referenced study of science teacher use of analogies, Dagher (1995a) 
found that teachers used analogies to “humanize science” (p. 260), clarify explanations, 
develop concepts, and communicate information. She found teacher use to be diverse and 
idiosyncratic; teachers drew on their own values and judgments of student interest. Like 
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Thiele and Treagust (1994), she found that students may not have understood what was 
intended by some of the analogies. 
In a more recent literature review of classroom analogy use, Oliva et al. (2007) 
found few studies documenting teachers planning the use of analogies and a few studies 
on the placement of analogies and one on the roles of students and teachers. They 
questioned teachers and found large discrepancies between how the teachers thought 
analogies should be presented and how they reported presenting analogies. 
These observational studies are representative of the literature and provide 
evidence that neither teachers nor students often approach analogy use strategically. Both 
students and teachers tend to use analogies spontaneously and without much planning for 
how these tools could promote learning. In fact Thiele and Treagust (1994) suggested that 
teachers are not familiar with the power of using analogies, as evidenced by their 
disregard for valuing one analogy over another. These studies found that analogies are 
seldom chosen in advance of instruction. The teachers did not consider any documented 
effectiveness for their analogies or base their choices on pedagogical principles or even 
on scientific soundness.  
Experts and novices. Evidence for steps or a progression during analogy use 
comes from studies of experts and novices using analogies. Clement (1988) identified 
four processes within analogy use, as he observed scientifically trained experts faced with 
an unfamiliar problem. He followed up (1998) by documenting the similarities in how 
experts and novices approach using analogies. Even though he did not provide sources, 
he found that both experts and high school students naturally used analogical reasoning. 
Both groups went through a similar process of choosing a source (although the experts 
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chose more helpful sources), matching the key relationships, and transferring information 
from sources to targets, often through a series of bridging analogies.  
Working with much younger children, Mayer, Hammer, and Roy (2006) observed 
how even the young students followed much the same pattern. They found that the 
children tried and discarded several analogies as they built explanations, tested them, and 
adjusted them in response to critiques from peers.  
Cultural differences. One pertinent series of observations about analogy use was 
done using the Trends in Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) videotapes (Richland 
et al., 2004; Richland & McDonough, 2010; Richland et al., 2007). Classroom lessons 
were videotaped for a purposeful sample of eighth-grade mathematics and science 
lessons in the United States, Australia, the Czech Republic, Hong Kong SAR, Japan, the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland. Other than the U.S., the other countries were chosen 
because their students were consistently top performers on international tests. 
In the first analysis, which was of mathematics classrooms, Richland et al. (2004) 
found several consistent differences among the classrooms. First, verbal analogies were 
used more frequently in American classrooms than in the higher performing classrooms. 
Second, very few instances of students mapping the source to the target were found in the 
American classrooms. 
Richland et al. (2007) focused on how analogies were used in American, Hong 
Kong SAR, and Japanese mathematics classrooms. They specifically looked for, among 
other characteristics, explicit mapping of information from a known source to an 
unknown target and alignment and mapping strategies. They found that Asian teachers 
used more spatial supports and gestures and gave more prompts for mental 
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representations than did American teachers. The researchers hypothesized that the lack of 
scaffolding cues, such as gestures and prompts, in American classrooms may lead to 
uncertainty about what the students are actually visualizing and encoding into memory. 
Lessons Learned from Qualitative Studies. For the current research study, these 
qualitative studies provide three key findings. First of all, analogies are usually used in 
classrooms without planning or pedagogical focus. Second, analogy use follows a 
progression or series of steps on the part of the learner. Third, teachers were seldom 
observed helping students follow a progression or assisting with mapping the sources to 
the targets. 
Analogies in Textbooks 
The natural tendency in science classrooms would be to expect that science 
textbooks would provide analogies to help students learn concepts. Textbooks, however, 
are surprising sparse in some aspects of analogy use that could help students. 
 Curtis and Reigeluth (1984) analyzed 26 science textbooks, elementary to post-
secondary, that were published between 1963 and 1983. They found that science 
textbooks provided no instructions for analogy use. Most analogies used a concrete base 
and an abstract target and were embedded within the context of the explanation. While 
many of the analogies included some relational mapping help, most were text-based and 
few had visual aids. With 49% of the analogies, there was no attempt to ensure the 
sources were understood by the learners. 
Glynn et al. (1989) found that high school and physics textbooks had more 
elaborately developed analogies. Textbooks for both older students (college) and for 
younger students tended to provide just very brief analogical statements for concepts. 
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Analyzing 43 textbooks, they found no mention of how analogies could be used in any of 
the textbook introductions, either in the teacher or student editions. They suggested that, 
if the textbooks were not going to discuss how analogies work, teachers have a 
responsibility to fill that role. 
 Iding (1997) proposed that textbook publishers and authors must think that 
analogies are effective instructional tools because of the frequency of their appearance in 
written materials. While this belief is “intuitively compelling” (p. 234), she found little 
development of analogies in the materials or assistance with their use, for either teachers 
or students. 
 Chemistry, biology, and physics textbooks used in Australia have been examined 
(Thiele & Treagust, 1994; Thiele et al., 1995; Venville & Treagust, 1997). Most of the 
analogies were presented without any assistance for mapping or assuring that the source 
was understood. In tandem, they interviewed textbook authors. The authors clearly 
understood the value of analogies but were reluctant to elaborate on analogies in print 
because they thought it needed to be done in the classroom, where analogies could be 
tailored to the reactions of the students. The textbook authors expected that teachers 
would provide instruction on strategies for using analogies. 
 Newton (2003) replicated Curtis and Reigeluth’s (1984) analysis with 80 
elementary expository science books, rather than textbooks. She found fewer analogies, 
which tended to emphasize the structural features rather than underlying concepts. More 
illustrations were used with books for younger children. None provided information on 
how to use the analogies. College textbooks, specifically biochemistry textbooks, also 
provide analogies (Orgill & Bodner, 2006). However, even though textbooks are so 
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important to college students, strategies for using analogies were not provided, nor were 
many of the analogies detailed enough to help students with mapping. 
Lessons Learned from Textbook Analysis. Textbooks cannot be relied on to 
provide strategies for using analogies effectively. Very few instances have been found 
where the analogies are explicitly mapped. Textbooks provide analogies, but the teacher 
needs to provide contexts and strategies for using analogies.  
Quantitative Studies 
 Because analogies have been studied so intensely for such a long time, there is a 
plethora of quantitative studies about their usefulness. The hurdle is that each researcher 
chose a different outcome as a measure of effectiveness. For the current research project, 
I will summarize findings from those that studied the effectiveness of analogies for 
science learning, those that examined the importance of mapping, and studies about 
bridging analogies.  
Analogy vs. no analogy. The classic design of studies on the effectiveness of 
analogies is a comparison between an analogy condition and a no-analogy condition. This 
has been done across a wide age spectrum. However, as several researchers have pointed 
out, there is not always consistency in what is labeled and tested as an analogy (Dagher et 
al.,1993; Glynn et al., 1989; Oliva et al., 2007; Pramling, 2009). It is also clear that the 
outcomes measured are very different for each study, making generalizations difficult.  
With and without analogies for young children. One of the classic studies of the 
effect of analogy use on learning was done by Newton and Newton (1995). They studied 
six- and seven-year-olds learning about electric currents. In the analogy condition, 
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children saw an analogous demonstration using a pump soap dispenser filled with water. 
Students were then interviewed as they built a circuit with a battery and small light bulb.  
In this study, the children were not told that the pump was like an electric circuit. 
Yet the analogy condition group was better able to give reasons for the circuit they built. 
Almost half of the analogy condition group spontaneously referred to the pump 
demonstration in their explanations. 
Conceptual change. Chiu and Lin (2005) studied a variety of analogy conditions 
to determine if different conditions led to ontological shift, as described by Chi et al. 
(1994). They used no analogies, single analogies, similar analogies (two sources 
providing the same features), and complementary analogies (two sources providing 
different features). When 10-year-old students were given post-tests and interviewed, the 
researchers found that the group provided with complementary analogies showed 
statistically significant ontological shifts in predicate use.  
Unfortunately, no previous work on complementary or similar analogies was 
cited. The findings about ontological shift would have been more powerful if specific 
evidence for a distinction between the types of analogies was documented. This study, 
though, does represent another outcome researchers use to measure learning with 
analogies. 
Text-based. Fourth- and sixth-grade students were provided with either a text-
based analogy or a text with no analogy (Yanowitz, 2001). The paragraphs were adjusted 
so that the length was not a variable. Each participant was tested immediately after 
reading. 
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In this study, the researcher was interested in measuring performance on questions 
requiring inferences. There was no significant difference in recall between the analogy 
and control groups. However, the students in the analogy group answered significantly 
more inferential questions correctly than did the control group students, and the sixth-
graders answered more inferential questions than did the fourth-graders. 
In a follow-up experiment, the non-analogy paragraphs were stripped of 
extraneous details and the paragraphs were read aloud by the teacher, rather than read by 
the students. The shorter paragraphs for the control or no-analogy group were read twice 
by the teachers. Again those in the analogy condition scored significantly better on the 
inferential questions. This study points out the importance of measuring more than recall 
when studying analogy effectiveness. It also provides evidence that repetition of 
information is not an equivalent elaboration strategy when compared with analogy use. 
Multimedia. In another recent study, researchers varied the amount of multimedia 
used in electrical circuit instruction with water flow analogies (Zheng et al., 2008). They 
measured both recall and transfer and found that analogies using multimedia were the 
most effective for fourth-graders. These researchers explained this as the result of 
schematic networks being activated by multimedia and less complex networks being 
activated by text-based analogies.  
Lessons learned from evaluating analogy use. This sample of studies comparing 
analogy conditions and no-analogy conditions demonstrates the wide variety of outcomes 
measured in studies. The outcomes being studied dictate the design and what is 
controlled. It is also important to note that, in no studies were all of the children using 
analogies more successful than those not using analogies. In all of them, some students 
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not using analogies were also successful when outcomes were measured. Unfortunately, 
in none of these studies was effect sizes reported. 
Scaffolding with analogies. There are few empirical studies that address 
strategies for using analogies. This section summarizes representative studies in which 
analogy use was combined with helping students understand analogy use, specifically the 
process of mapping. 
Cued alignment. To test the hypothesis that American teachers need to assist 
students by providing alignment cues during analogy use, Richland and McDonough 
(2010) compared undergraduate student outcomes from “highly supported” analogy use 
with student outcomes from “minimally supported” analogy use (p. 30). The highly 
supported analogies, in videotaped instruction, provided support for noticing the 
alignment between source and target. On a post-test, the cued group had significantly 
higher scores than the minimally supported group when the source and target were very 
different. A follow-up study reported by the same authors found that undergraduate 
students who were cued had statistically stronger scores on both a post-test and a delayed 
post-test. 
Extensive scaffolding. With much younger children, Flick (1991) studied an 
extensive unit on states of matter. Third-, fourth-, and fifth-grade students moved through 
30-minute lessons each day for two weeks. In the lessons, a collaborative class diagram 
was developed, showing the characteristics of a sugar cube as it was crushed into chunks, 
powder, and dust. The students then labeled the parts of the diagram to correspond with 
states of water. 
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On pre-test and post-tests, Flick analyzed the student answers for operational 
descriptions or those using terms from one domain (sugar) to explain another (water). 
The increase in these analogous descriptions from pre- to post-test was statistically 
significant.  
Justifying similarity ratings. Mason (2004) worked with eighth-grade students to 
see if they could not only rate similarities between two scenarios, but if they could justify 
their ratings. She found that, unlike the Kurtz et al. (2001) study done with adults, 
younger students gained the most when they were asked to list the commonalities 
between the scenarios. She suggested that active comparison provided an opportunity for 
seeing the underlying structure. It appears that active comparison served the purpose of 
an elaboration strategy. 
Writing about the mapping. Klein et al. (2007) used a variety of assignments to 
have undergraduate students map a source to a target. One group wrote about the 
analogy, one group verbally described the analogy, and one group did a think aloud while 
writing about the analogy. They were interested in the load on working memory that each 
of these tasks would impose on learning the science concepts. 
Students with low working memory spans scored higher in the writing and think 
aloud plus writing conditions than in the speaking condition; there were no statistically 
significant differences among the higher working memory students. Regardless of 
working memory span, students in the writing conditions used more third-order 
relationships, which mapped causal relationships, than did students in the speaking 
condition. When a sequential analysis was done of the steps used by the students, it was 
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found that writers explicitly mapped explanations from the source to the target while 
speakers did not, even if they were able to understand the concept. 
Working memory limits. In another study of the load on working memory, Tohill 
and Holyoak (2000) studied how taxing working memory would affect analogy use. They 
hypothesized that aligning relationships takes more working memory capacity than 
mapping surface features. They randomly assigned university students to an induced 
anxiety group and a non-anxiety group. Both groups were given a pair of line drawings 
on a computer screen. An object was identified in the first drawing and subjects were to 
identify an analogous object in the other drawing. The pairs of pictures were cross-
mapped, so underlying relationships, rather than surface features, were needed to find the 
analogous objects. As they hypothesized, the induced anxiety group was less likely to 
pair based on underlying relationships, even when the experiment was repeated with 
instructions to find pairs based on relationships. 
Learning is constrained by limited working memory. Elaboration allows a learner 
to connect and activate existing schema and to chunk information (Chi, 2000; Nussbaum, 
2008). The mapping or alignment in an analogy provides elaboration to foster learning. 
 Mapping guidance. Blake’s (2004) study of 9- through 11-year-olds provides 
further evidence of the value of guidance for mapping. He measured use of non-
scientific, proto-scientific, or scientific explanations after children were taught with an 
analogy or not. The analogy condition group was given instruction about analogies. The 
source (aluminum can recycling) and target (rock cycle) were specific mapped with the 
children, one feature at a time. Concept maps were analyzed for explanations. There was 
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a statistically significant advantage for those in the analogy group. They also used their 
new knowledge with greater accuracy than the control group did.  
 The gains made were movements from non-scientific to proto-scientific 
explanations, rather than leaps from non-scientific to scientific. They also noted that not 
all children in the analogy group made gains and that some children in the control group 
made gains. 
 Persistence of strategies. Tunteler and Resing (2007) studied whether strategies 
for using analogies learned by young children (ages five through seven) would persist 
over time. Group one was given assistance in the form of a story problem that was 
analyzed and then, feature by feature, compared to a second story problem. For six 
weeks, this group repeated this procedure each week. A second group also did this 
activity weekly, but without the initial training. A third group did the activity, without 
training, at week one and four. A fourth group was given only the target story problem 
each week. All were scored on whether they used an analogy for solving and whether 
they verbalized using an analogy. The researchers concluded that the initial training 
fostered spontaneous use of analogies over time and that this was more pronounced for 
older children. The importance of this study is that it demonstrated that strategies taught 
to children were not only worthwhile but persistent. 
Less successful analogy use. One of the most frequently cited studies of the 
effectiveness of analogies was done by Duit et al. (2001). They used student discourse as 
a measurement of conceptual change, as students changed from natural, colloquial 
language to gradually more appropriate scientific language. They were not specifically 
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trying to show an effect of analogy use, but were trying to relate the role of analogies in 
learning to what students said. 
 In this German, 10th-grade physics class, the students worked collaboratively on a 
series of analogies to help them understand chaotic systems. They found that students 
needed a great deal of assistance in aligning the sources and targets because they often 
struggled with determining which features to map or focused on surface similarities. This 
study was done in the context of a very complex concept, one few of us understand well. 
The value, though, was in documenting how student interpreted the analogy and how 
much scaffolding they needed. The researchers concluded that analogies can lead to both 
learning and misconceptions; therefore, students need “substantial guidance” in using 
analogies, especially for complex concepts (p. 30). 
Lessons learned from scaffolding with analogies. Each of these studies used 
assistance for the learners in using analogies, either through teaching them how to use 
analogies or by providing a structure that required students to explicitly map. Taken 
together, they provide evidence that mapping is difficult and transfer of accurate 
scientific information cannot be taken for granted. They also provide evidence that 
structures providing elaboration during the mapping process are beneficial, and that 
persistent strategies can be taught. However, in all of these studies, not all students 
benefitted the same way. Analogies are effective in different ways for different students.  
Classroom Models 
Research Base for Classroom Models 
With all that has been researched about analogies in classrooms, there are 
surprisingly few studies of how teachers can effectively present and use analogies with 
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students. This section presents information on what should be the basis for a classroom 
model and the classroom models that have been proposed by researchers. 
Useful classroom models of instructional analogy use should be aligned with what 
is known about how analogies work and learning theory. Fortunately, over the last 40 
years, a theoretical model has been developed and tested to specifically explain mapping, 
the focus of the current study.  
Mapping for transfer. A good theory for mapping would allow prediction of the 
transfers, explain how the mapping happens, account for how it is constrained, and be 
based on evidence for these explanations. The source and target components of an 
analogy can be mapped, or aligned, based on either surface features (such as shape, size, 
color, etc.) or relationships (such as cause and effect), which are also known as the 
structure. The value of an analogy is in identifying the underlying structure or principle 
that is common to both the source and target. If a learner maps the features of a source 
onto the target, little would be transferred about the principles or concepts underlying the 
target. The source would simply be a description of the target. Unless the underlying 
structure and relationships of the features is mapped, inferences cannot be made in order 
to build and organize knowledge of the target. The important point is that information is 
mapped from source to target through a system of relationships, regardless of whether or 
not the objects themselves are very similar.  
Structure mapping. Most of the research literature relies on Gentner’s structure-
mapping theory to explain mapping for transfer. According to this theory, relationships 
are mapped rather than features, and there is a one-to-one, parallel correspondence of 
source and target features and their relationships. The systematicity principle explains 
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how mapping is constrained (Gentner, 1983; 1988; 1989; Gentner & Markman, 1997; 
Gentner & Toupin, 1986; Markman, 1997). 
Relationships. Any description of analogical mapping has to account for the 
inhibition of matching appearances and the promotion of choosing relational structures. 
Both the source and target have attributes or components, some of which are features and 
some of which are predicates that indicate relationships. An often-cited depiction of this 
distinction is given by Gentner and Toupin (1986). If the source and target both have 
features that are red, that is an attribute match and could be notated as 
[Red (bi)] → [Red (ti)]. 
Note that Gentner and Toupin use the term “base,” distinguished by the “b,” rather than 
“source.” Their next example, of a structural match, uses the relationship between two 
attributes of the source, bi and bj and the relationship between two attributes of the target, 
ti and tj: 
[Collide (bi, bj)] → [Collide (ti, tj)]. 
In other words, the relationship between bi and bj is that they collide. The relationship 
between ti and tj is also one of collision. This makes the source and target analogous 
because they have the same relationship between features. The arrow indicates that the 
relationship between the source attributes becomes an inference that transfers to the 
relationship between the target attributes.  
Feature attributes can be singular. In contrast, relational predicates need a pairing 
or an argument (Gentner, 1983). To understand this, think of a causal situation. There is 
no causation if there is only one feature or object attribute. Any relationship requires 
more than one feature, attribute, or component.  
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Over the years, a great deal of evidence has been gathered for human preference 
for comparing relationships over features (Holyoak, 2005). In naturalistic settings, people 
tend to compare relationships rather than features (Dunbar, 2001). Adults tend to interpret 
analogies relationally, when they could be either relational or featural, and judge the 
aptness of metaphors and analogies higher if there are relational interpretations. (Gentner, 
1988). In one set of studies, adults were tasked with determining whether or not two 
sentences were analogous. The researchers changed the verbs to change the relationships 
and the nouns to change the surface features. The researchers also tracked the response 
time. As predicted by structural mapping theory, the subjects consistently rated 
relationally similar sentences as more analogous than featurally similar sentences. They 
also found that, when the relationships were similar but not synonymous, the processing 
time was longer (Gentner & Kurtz, 2006). In another study, people were given pairs of 
stories. The stories were remembered on the basis of surface similarities. However, when 
the subjects were asked to use one story to make inferences about the other, they used the 
structural similarities or relationships (Gentner et al., 1993). 
In another study, each participant was given pairs of sentences and asked to 
justify whether or not the pairs were analogous. Sometimes the subjects rejected a pair 
because the same verbs took on different meanings when paired with different objects. 
An example that came to my mind was the different meaning of a sentence about kicking 
a soccer ball compared to a sentence about kicking a dog. The researchers concluded they 
had evidence for the importance of relational structure (Gentner & Kurtz, 2006).  
One-to-one correspondence. Attributes of the source are mapped in a one-to-one 
correspondence with features of the target, based on their roles. In other words, a 
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relationship in the source is mapped only to a single relationship in the target. This 
bidirectional parallelism is known as isomorphism, and it is critical to shaping the 
analogy (Klauer, 1989; Markman, 1997). It follows logically that the matched 
relationships will have matched arguments (Gentner & Markman, 1997; Markman, 
1997). For example, if the relationship in the source is [Tug (b1,b2], the mapped 
relationship in the target is inferred to be [Tug (t1,t2)] or even [Move (t1,t2)], not a 
completely different relationship, such as [Create (t1,t2)]. Relationships can also be 
parallel because of the differences, because analogies use simultaneous, not hierarchical 
instances (Mason, 2004). The example that Bill is a boy and Margo is a girl is aligned, 
through the commonality of gender. However, that Margo is tall and Bill is happy is not 
parallel or aligned. 
Systematicity principle. Systems of relationships are preferred over isolated 
relationships and higher order and more complex relationships are used over simple 
relationships (Gentner, 1983; Gentner & Toupin, 1986; Markman, 1997). If predicates 
belong to a system of relationships, they are more likely to be mapped with the target. 
Meaning is built because networks of relationships are mapped over isolated pairs of 
features. There are many combinations of possible mappings between a source and target; 
the systematicity principle actually puts constraints on all the possible relationships that 
could be mapped (Gentner, 1988; 1989; Gentner et al., 2001; Gentner & Markman, 
1997).  
Predicting. Structure-mapping theory, which describes the importance of 
underlying structure, one-to-one correspondence and the systematicity principle, allows 
accurate prediction of which predicates will be mapped by considering the underlying 
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relationships. This is really important for science educators, as they are scaffolding 
development of scientific mental models. I will use the ubiquitous cell-nucleus-is-like-
the-mayor analogy as an example. When students map the pairing, the physical features 
are disregarded in deference to the roles or underlying structures (primacy of 
relationships). The functions a mayor performs are mapped, one-to-one, to the functions a 
nucleus performs (parallel, one-to-one mappings). Because the mayor’s roles are part of a 
system of relationships with other components of the town, those predicates are used over 
isolated predicates (systematicity principle). 
Mental models. Concept building, specifically in science education, requires 
understanding the development of mental models (Vosniadou, 1989). Structure mapping 
theory provides the basis for how these models are constructed, but leaves open questions 
about misconceptions. Students tend to take a source literally, rather than as a model for 
the target. I propose that students need to be able to identify where the mapping breaks 
down in order to combat this. 
Models 
It is important to know, first of all, whether teachers do actually provide or plan 
steps for helping students use analogies. Richland et al. (2004) analyzed TIMMS 
videotapes from American eighth-grade mathematics classrooms. They looked for 
instances in which the base and target were specifically mapped in the classrooms. 
Teachers “produced hints towards mappings” (p. 48) in most lessons that had analogies. 
After analyzing, they suggested that “if the teacher is producing a large number of the 
analogies, it is unknown whether students are understanding the structural mapping 
underlying the analogy or are simply waiting for the teachers’ interpretation” (p. 55). 
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Their research led them to suggest that students may be more likely to understand 
analogies in which there is explicit mapping. 
Again using the TIMMS video bank, Richland, Zur, and Holyoak (2007) followed 
up with a comparison of analogy use in Hong Kong, Japan, and the United States. They 
found that the Asian teachers “provided more support for learning from analogies than 
did the U.S. teachers” (p. 29). Asian teachers did this by using cuing scaffolds, such as 
keeping the base visible while pointing out alignment between the base and target. A 
strategy such as this may not only reduce demands on working memory but may draw 
attention to the comparison. 
These observations were done in mathematics classrooms, not science. However, 
other researchers have also proposed that there is value in having steps or strategies for 
using analogies in classrooms (Clement, 1993; 1998; Glynn, 1991; Treagust, Harrison, & 
Venville, 1998; Zeitoun, 1984). Unfortunately, the classroom models available to 
teachers are generally lacking in empirical evidence about their components and are 
devoid of theoretical underpinnings. 
A myriad of observational studies of classrooms have provided examples of the 
components of structure mapping theory. In contrast, there are four classroom 
pedagogical models that have been developed. In this case, I am using the term “model” 
specifically for a systematic set of strategies purported to help students learn from 
analogies. As Treagust, Harrison, and Venville point out, teachers are seldom trained in 
the use of analogies and their dangers, so “a carefully planned pedagogy is required” 
(1998, p. 87). Other researchers have also decried the lack of research connecting studies 
of analogies with research on teaching models (Oliva et al., 2007). 
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GMAT. One of the earliest models for classroom use of analogies was the 
General Model of Analogy Teaching or GMAT (Zeitoun, 1984). Based on his review of 
what was known about analogies and their limitations related to learning, Zeitoun 
proposed nine steps to use when teaching with analogies. None of these steps are specific 
to what students do; all focus on the teacher actions and preparation: (a) determine if the 
students understand analogical learning; (b) assess students’ prior knowledge about the 
target; (c) analyze what the students need to learn about the target; (d) evaluate the 
analogy for appropriateness to the target and determine whether it will be easily taught 
and understood; (e) look at what resources will be needed for using the analogy; (f) 
decide on a teaching strategy and the context; (g) guide students through the analogy; (h) 
evaluate the success; and i) revise.  
This model is often referenced by other researchers; however, I was not able to 
find quantitative studies that attempted to validate this model. Much of this model is 
simply good teaching practice, rather than being specific to using analogies, so bits and 
pieces have been validated in educational research. Steps three, four, and seven, though, 
are specific to using analogies and could promote effective analogy use in classrooms.  
TWA. The Teaching With Analogies (TWA) model was developed to outline the 
steps that should be used when teaching with an analogy (Glynn, 1991; Glynn et al., 
1989). Nineteen high school science textbooks were reviewed and effective analogies in 
them were identified (Glynn et al., 1989). The value of analogy is a function of its goal; 
in this case, instruction was the goal, and three criteria were used: (a) the number of 
features to compare; (b) the similarity of the features; and (c) the conceptual significance 
of that comparison (see p. 386). The determination of analogy effectiveness, however, 
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was made from a pedagogical viewpoint, with no measure of actual student learning; 
analogies that followed a pattern of good instructional practice were considered effective. 
Once the exemplary analogies were identified, six steps were identified for the TWA 
model. These start with introducing the target concept, then recalling a source concept. 
Next the similar features of the two concepts are identified and mapped. From that 
mapping, conclusions about the concepts are drawn. Finally, where the analogy breaks 
down should be noted. They suggested that this model would be helpful in teaching 
students to “interpret, criticize, and extend an author’s analogy” (Glynn et al.,1989, p. 
390). Authors and teachers could also consider this model as they choose and present 
analogies. 
Studies of TWA. Use of the TWA model is often described qualitatively (Glynn, 
2007; 2008). A typical example is the description of a teacher’s script during a science 
lesson (2008). The script for the introduction to the lesson was provided. As a qualitative 
description, however, it was weak, perhaps because it was intended for a practitioner 
audience. There were no efforts to describe how the teacher chose the analogy, if she did. 
Apparently the students were listening to a lecture, which included a diagram comparing 
Coulomb’s law with Newton’s law of gravitational force. No description of what the 
students did was given, nor was there any indication that the teacher checked for 
understanding, either by asking or answering any questions. The reader had no context 
for the observation or even any idea of whether there was an observation or if the teacher 
supplied the script. In another example, Glynn provides a description of how TWA 
should be used with a “fictitious conversation” rather than an actual observation (1991, p. 
234-237).  
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As an isolated example, this description of Glynn’s TWA model is not alarming. 
However, for a “research-based model” (Glynn, 2008, p. 113), it is very difficult to find 
research that shows its effective use in classrooms. The TWA model was developed from 
analysis of textbooks and Glynn has called for empirical studies to validate the model 
(Glynn, 1991). In a personal communication requesting information on validation of the 
TWA model (October 20, 2010), Dr. Glynn pointed me towards a practitioner-focused 
article in Science and Children (Glynn, 2007), an article on considerations for web-based 
instructional strategies (Glynn et al., 2007), and two studies on the effectiveness of 
textbook analogies (Glynn & Takahashi, 1998; Paris & Glynn, 2004).  
Glynn and Takahashi (1998) studied middle school students using textbook 
analogies that had both a text and a graphic component, what they termed “elaborate” 
analogies (p. 1130). Their operational definition for “elaborate analogy” has three 
components: systematic mapping, activation of verbal and visual process, and the 
interaction between the mapping and processes. No background information on or 
reference to cognitive processes was used. The analogy between a factory and an animal 
cell was constructed according to TWA model guidelines.  
Eighth-grade students (N = 58, ages 12 to 14 years old) were randomly assigned 
into either the experimental treatment group or the control group. The experimental group 
read a text that had the factory/cell analogy at the beginning, accompanied by a line 
drawing of workers in a factory, labeled as the parts of a cell. The control group read a 
description of each component of the cell and its function (no analogy). There was no 
group that used an analogy that was not constructed by TWA guidelines. There was a 
between-subjects variable of the text type and a within-subjects variable of retention 
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interval when students were tested on recall by having to describe what each cell part 
does. For each cell component, the answer was either correct or incorrect when scored. 
After the recall test, students were also asked whether the cell components and their 
functions reminded them of anything similar, and they wrote out their answers. 
The students using the analogy-enhanced text had higher recall scores, F(1,56) = 
7.96, p = .007, MSE = 4.44. The recall scores did not differ significantly, nor was there a 
statistically significant interaction effect.   
The experiment was then replicated with sixth-grade students (N = 32, ages 10 to 
12 years old), again with only two groups, no analogies or TWA-designed analogies, and 
a recognition test was given in addition to the recall test and the reminder question.  
At three points in time, before the intervention, right after the intervention, and 
after two weeks, students were also asked to rate the target (cell components and their 
functions) on a questionnaire as to being important, interesting, and understandable. 
Analyses were done the same as in the first experiment, but analyses of 
covariance (ratings before the intervention as covariate) were used to determine the 
effects of the type of text and the two-week interval on interest, importance, and 
understandability ratings. For both the recall and recognition questions, the experimental 
group scores were significantly higher than control groups’, F(1,30) = 14.51, p < .001 
and F(1,30) = 11.13, p = .002 respectively. With these younger children, the immediate 
scores were significantly higher than the scores after a two-week interval, and the 
experimental group still scored significantly higher than the control group. The 
intervention group rated the concept as significantly more understandable than the control 
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group did. When the effect of the analogy was compared between sixth- and eighth-grade 
students, the analogy accounted for almost three times more variance. 
These two experiments provided evidence that the effects of the TWA analogies 
were stronger for the younger students but beneficial at both age levels. Students’ ability 
to remember the analogy was stable over the two-week interval and those using the 
analogy displayed more depth in their answers. The analogy used included statements 
about where the analogy did not align and broke down. However, students were not given 
instruction on what an analogy is or strategies for using analogies to learn. This study was 
limited to text-based instruction; there were no student-to-student interactions or 
interactions with the teacher.  
Paris and Glynn (2004) studied elaborate analogies in science texts used by adult 
pre-service teachers. In this study, there were three levels of analogies: no analogy 
(control), simple analogy, and elaborate analogy. In their operational definitions, a simple 
analogy is a statement, with no details, explanations, or mapping cues. They defined an 
elaborate analogy as it was described above (Glynn & Takahashi, 1998), hypothesizing 
that it provided instructional scaffolding. In this study, three different analogies were 
used. A factory was used as an analogy source for an animal cell, an electric current was 
compared to water flowing through pipes, and the human eye was analogous to a camera. 
Each analogy was built using the guidelines of the TWA model and each contained a 
labeled diagram of the source showing the alignment with the target. A labeled diagram 
of the target concept or object was included in both the no analogy text and the simple 
analogy text. 
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All subjects (N = 140) read and studied three passages, one for each concept or 
object. Each subject read about one concept with no analogy, another concept with a 
simple analogy, and another concept with an elaborate analogy, in random order. After 
studying the three texts, each participant answered nine questions, three questions for 
each concept, about their interest, understanding, and ability to explain the concept. They 
then ranked the passages as interesting, helpful for understanding, and helpful for 
explaining to others. Finally, they were tested with a series of questions, scored as 
acceptable or unacceptable, designed to assess retention of information, ability to make 
inferences about the information, and metacognitive awareness or confidence about 
giving the correct answer. Just over half of the participants were also interviewed and 
asked to explain their text rankings.  
For all three concepts, ratings (interest, helpful for understanding, and helpful for 
explaining) were significantly higher for the elaborate analogy texts than either the no 
analogy or simple analogy texts, which were not different statistically. Participants found 
the text more interesting, more helpful for understanding the concept, and more helpful if 
they were to explain the concept to others in the elaborate analogy conditions. Retention 
of information was significantly higher, inference-making was better, and subjects were 
best at self-evaluation in the elaborate analogy text conditions, and there were no 
statistically significant differences between the no analogy and the simple analogy 
conditions.  
The researchers concluded that elaborate analogies, which, according to their 
operational definition, include text and graphics, specify the alignment between source 
and target, indicate where the analogy breaks down, and provide conclusions that can be 
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drawn from the analogy, were effective in retention of knowledge because the analogy 
provided instructional scaffolding, greater imagery, and the advantage of tapping into 
existing conceptual networks. Participants were better able to judge their own 
understanding of the concepts and found them more engaging. This research design did 
not isolate which components of the elaborate analogies may have been helpful. It could 
have been the TWA steps. It could have been the combination of text and graphics. Or it 
could have been a combination of the elements. 
Usefulness of TWA. The value of the TWA model is in its specific steps, which 
have potential to help teachers and/or students work through the analogical reasoning 
process. The process does not need to be linear; many teachers, for example, use 
pedagogical models in which the target concept is not identified at the beginning of the 
lesson cycle. The second listed step may give the impression that students must recall or 
retrieve their own source. This does not make sense if they do not know what the target is 
or understand the target, for they have no criteria for an appropriate source. Instead, with 
instructional analogies, the source is provided by the teacher and should be carefully 
chosen to activate students’ prior knowledge. 
The TWA model is an intuitively useful model. However, it was developed on a 
very subjective definition of what makes an effective analogy and through the 
examination of textbooks, not even classroom observations. No references to specific 
learning theories or models were given (Glynn, 1991; 1996; 2007; 2008; Glynn et al., 
1989; Glynn & Taasoobshirazi, & Fowler, 2007; Glynn & Takahashi, 1998; Paris & 
Glynn, 2004). It is difficult to judge the value of an intervention without a theoretical 
basis. I am reminded of Stephen Hawking’s statement about the importance of having a 
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theory to explain the mechanisms, as our understandings are “conditioned by the theory 
to which we subscribe” (1993, p. 43). 
As mentioned previously, Glynn et al. (1989) gave three criteria for judging the 
value of an instructional analogy. Based on structure-mapping theory (Gentner, 1983; 
1989) I would suggest different criteria for judging the value of an analogy. First of all, 
an analogy should be judged valuable if learning can be associated with it, qualitatively 
or quantitatively. Second, an analogy should be judged valuable if enough of the 
underlying relationships in the source and target can be aligned to make inferences about 
the target based on the source. After all, the alignment of the underlying relationships is 
what makes an analogy unique. While “number of features compared” and “similarity of 
the features compared” (Glynn et al., 1989, p. 386) may help in retrieving an analogical 
source to use, especially in problem solving, comparing the surface features may actually 
lead to misconceptions (Newton, 2003). 
FAR. The FAR model (Focus, Action, Reflection) was developed by Australian 
researchers, Treagust, Harrison, and Venville (1998), while working with pre-service and 
in-service teachers. Research had shown that analogies sometimes led to misconceptions 
and little learning, and these researchers wanted a way to help science teachers use 
analogies more effectively. Over the course of several years, they worked with high 
school science teachers, using Glynn’s (1991) TWA model as a starting point. 
After five experienced teachers used the TWA model in their classrooms, 
discussions were held about the successes and concerns. Teachers pointed out that the 
TWA model did not guide planning or reflection, two important aspects of teaching, thus 
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the “Focus, Action, Reflection” pattern was developed. This newer model was then used 
by six teachers and was adjusted slightly. 
The FAR model is designed to give steps that the teacher should consider in using 
analogies in the classroom. Under the heading “Focus,” this model includes thinking 
about the concept to be taught, its difficulty level, abstractness, and what students may 
already know. At this point, the teacher should consider the source and whether it is a 
concept, event, or thing with which students will be familiar. During the “Action” 
sequence, the teacher guides students through the similarities and differences between the 
source and target, including where the analogy breaks down. Finally, in the “Reflection” 
portion, the teacher decides whether the analogy was useful and appropriate and what 
adjustments need to be made for future use. 
Studies of FAR. When this model was used in classrooms, the teachers reported 
they felt more confident about using analogies, they took into consideration students’ 
existing knowledge, and they pinpointed how they would change the presentation for the 
future. The teachers thought that guiding students through the similarities and differences 
was useful to the students. Several brought up that their own weak content knowledge 
made some analogies very confusing. Several recommended that students be taught the 
value of analogies and trained to use them. The researchers then used the FAR model 
with final-year pre-service teachers in order to help them address known student 
misconceptions (Treagust et al., 1998; Treagust et al., 1996). 
Over the years, this model has formed the basis for many case studies of analogy 
use, particularly by these authors, but seldom describing what teachers or students do 
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during each step. I was unable to find any studies of the model’s effectiveness for 
students. 
Usefulness of FAR. Like the TWA model described above, FAR is intuitively 
gratifying. However, it is not grounded in a theoretical base or even on well-known 
educational research of classroom practices. It is a very teacher-centered model, designed 
for and used by teachers. There is no quantitative evidence for its effectiveness as a 
strategy. Carefully controlled studies, isolating each of the steps of the model, could be 
conducted. At the very least, the FAR model should be aligned with other education 
research.  
Bridging. A variation on classroom models of analogy use is bridging. It is very 
difficult for students to give up their naïve understandings, even with analogical 
demonstrations (Clement, 1998; Harrison & Treagust, 2000). In this model, students 
build their understandings, analogy by analogy, until they have overcome non-scientific 
explanations. Building on Minstrell’s work (1982), Clement (1993) used a series of 
related analogies for the forces on an object at rest, starting with a very accessible, 
plausible source, and ending with the more abstract source. With each analogy, students 
transferred inferences from the source to the target, and in some cases, the target then 
became the source for a new target. Work with bridging analogies has shown that 
gradually providing analogies to adjust student understanding can help, as students come 
to accept each step towards canonical understanding (Clement & Steinberg, 2002). 
Four case studies of tutoring sessions, two in which there was evidence of 
conceptual change and two in which there was not, identified factors that are important 
for the effective use of bridging analogies (Brown & Clement, 1989). Three students 
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working on four different physics misconceptions were tutored through an interview 
process. One student was a freshman in college; the other two were high school juniors. 
The researchers (Brown & Clement, 1989) found, first of all, that the students 
started out thinking they understood the source. In the first case study, for example, with 
a book resting on a table, the student thought he understood, but did not accept that the 
table was exerting an upward force. In a traditional use of an analogy, an assumption 
would be made that students understand the source and could make inferences to the 
target from it. These case studies pointed out the inherent problem with that assumption. 
The second finding of importance was how resistant the students were to accepting more 
canonical explanations, even when they were faced with and accepted the evidence in the 
form of analogies. It was clear that students did not accept the examples as analogous. It 
should be noted that there was no attempt to specifically map or align the source and 
target. 
Brown and Clement made a point that, in these case studies, “the analogies 
appeared to help enrich the students’ conceptions of the target situations” (p. 256). In 
other words, an analogical source provides features, attributes, and causal relationships 
for the target. Another point worth mentioning is that bridging analogies do not force the 
student to accept the soundness of the analogical relationship. Instead, students move 
from one intermediate analogy to another, after they accept the soundness of the first. 
Bridging analogies may be particularly useful when a student does not see the source and 
target as analogous. 
The factors that appeared to influence successful conceptual change were: (a) a 
source that is useful and accepted by the student; (b) explicit development of the 
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analogous relationship between the source and target through intermediate analogies; and 
(c) interaction between student and teachers in a process. 
Brown and Clement set out to specifically address misconceptions, known to be 
very robust and difficult to dislodge. There may be a limited need for bridging analogies, 
especially in situations where students do not have firmly entrenched misconceptions 
about the target. More traditional forms of instructional analogies may be adequate for 
building new explanatory models about the target. It should also be noted that it would be 
very, very difficult to develop sound analogy bridges for the myriad of target concepts 
that could benefit from being taught through analogies. At least some of the actual value 
of bridging analogies may come from the intense interaction described by Brown and 
Clement, providing deep elaboration time and activity, and the conflicting evidence 
presented, known to help with conceptual change (Russell & Martin, 2007). 
Studies of bridging. In a detailed case study, Clement and Steinberg (2002) set 
out to describe how a sequence of analogies led to revisions of a mental model of 
electricity for a 16-year-old girl during a summer tutoring session that consisted of five 
tutoring sessions over two weeks. They found that the student went through four distinct 
model revisions, each a step closer to a scientifically sound model of a circuit. At each 
step, a discrepant event was noted to trigger surprise in the subject, a cognitive 
dissonance that helped initiate revisions in her mental model. She developed a simple, but 
correct, mental model of an electric circuit.  
Clement and Steinberg were able to find patterns for several strategies the student 
used. One of these was that the tutor introduced an analogy at each point where the 
student experienced cognitive dissonance. She used these analogies to modify her mental 
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model. This pattern of dissonance, introduction of analogy from previous knowledge, and 
adjusting of the mental model was seen over and over again, in a cyclical fashion, a 
process they termed “GEM” or model generation, evaluation, modification. They used 
this evidence to argue that mental model building can be an evolution, a process of 
narrowing through evaluation, rather than a deduction process in which evidence is 
compiled and then combined to develop a model.  
Based on constructivist views of learning, Vygostky’s work with zones of 
proximal development, and scaffolding, Bryce and MacMillan (2005) studied how 15-
year-old students used a series of analogies designed to take them from naïve conceptions 
to more and more scientifically understanding. Through interviews with 21 students, they 
tried to detail what each analogy contributed to the understanding of reaction forces. 
They examined each analogy in terms of whether it contributed to the concept being 
understandable, plausible and useful in order to foster conceptual change (based on 
Posner et al., 1982).  
The first interview questions were designed to uncover student understandings 
about forces and reaction forces by having a student explain the forces on a book resting 
on a table. After the four analogies were demonstrated and experienced, students were 
asked to rank each for whether it made the existence and cause of the upward force from 
the table understandable, plausible and useful. 
Finally, students were given three novel but analogous scenarios, a person 
standing on a concrete floor, a book on a table on the moon, and a book on a table in deep 
space. The latter was considered as more abstract than the others and needing application 
of knowledge. Students described the understandability, believability, and usefulness of 
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these scenarios. The researchers coded responses for understandability, defining that as 
student statements about something making sense. Believability was coded on students’ 
ratings, and usefulness was coded if the student used it in explaining the existence or 
cause of a reaction force. 
Initially, the students taught without a series of analogies traditionally gave mid-
range believability ratings and used three or four causes for the forces, giving incorrect or 
confusing answers, except for one student who tentatively came close. The group that had 
been previously taught about forces showed even more variability in their explanations 
but showed predictable misunderstandings about inanimate objects exerting force. The 
group with no prior instruction about forces relied on their experience with gravity, but 
rated their beliefs in their answers very low. 
The four bridging analogies were rated differently by the students who used them. 
The first was very understandable and plausible. The second actually led to some 
misconceptions. The third was the most understandable, believe, and fruitful. At that 
point, most of the students had scientifically acceptable mental models. The fourth 
analogy did help some students gain confidence in their explanations. Even at the end, 
however, some students had dual, competing explanatory mental models.  
Usefulness of bridging. Bridging analogies are clearly built on structure mapping 
theory. They provide evidence for the importance of chunking concepts. Specific 
analogies need to be chosen to address the development of a scientifically accurate 
mental model. Students were not explicitly taught metacognitive strategies, though, or 
made aware of what they were doing. Rather than pointing out where each analogy broke 
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down, the instructors provided a carefully chosen discrepant event to move the student 
towards a mental model revision. 
In any work with analogies, mental models of the students must be considered. 
Analogies often provide a more concrete or familiar mental model that can be used to 
develop a mental model for the unfamiliar or more abstract. However, sequences of 
bridging analogies may not be available for teaching many science concepts. The 
bridging model may be useful in some situations. However, it is not practical as a general 
model of analogy use. It would be time consuming to develop and present the context in 
which students bridge from one analogy to another for many concepts. Finding and 
determining the appropriate series of analogies for most science concepts would be 
difficult for classroom teachers. Finally, there is no evidence that bridging is necessary as 
a general practice for teaching science concepts. 
Need for Current Study 
 From a cognitivist viewpoint, instructional analogies provide scaffolding for 
learning. They help learners organize new information or concepts based on schemata 
already organized and available in long-term memory. To tap into the power of these 
learning tools, teachers deserve research-based models of effective use. In general, the 
classroom models of analogy use proposed in the literature have been studied 
descriptively. Classroom models for analogy use have no theoretical basis and have not 
been aligned with other educational research findings. We know a great deal about how 
people learn. We also know how analogies should function within that learning process. 
We know that students learn differentially in analogy research studies. It stands to reason, 
therefore, that inconsistent results in studying analogy use may be the result of 
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inconsistent implementation of the steps students need for using analogies or needs for 
differentiation among students. There is a need for theoretically based research on how 
analogies could be used effectively.  
The Teaching With Analogies (TWA) model outlines steps for using analogies in 
classrooms. One of these steps is to specifically map the features of the source to the 
features of the target. This study examined the importance of including that step in the 
process of using instructional analogies. There were three research questions guiding the 
study: (a) Does explicit mapping of the source and target promote more learning than 
using an analogy without explicit mapping? (b) Do more-knowledgeable and less-
knowledgeable learners benefit differentially from mapping? and (c) Are there any 
benefits that persist over a short time related to either of the first two questions?   
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODS 
Design 
This study used a 3 X 3 X 3 mixed factorial design. The two between-subjects 
factors are: 1) Previous Science Knowledge Level (Levels 1, 2, and 3 with Level 1 being 
the lowest level); and 2) Type of Instruction Module (without analogy, with analogy, or 
with mapped analogy). The within-subjects factor was test Time (pre-test, immediate 
post-test, and delayed post-test). The dependent measures were scores of the three tests. 
Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (RM-ANOVA) was done to determine 
statistical significance for main effects for each factor, as well as interactions among the 
factors.  
Factors  
Previous science knowledge level. Originally, the study was designed with 
assignment of each student to a Previous Science Proficiency Level, determined by each 
subject’s eighth-grade science Criterion-Referenced Test (CRT) proficiency level. This 
statewide, standards-based test is administered towards the end of the eighth grade. 
However, the school district was not able to provide CRT scores for all of the subjects, so 
many of the cells were too small for analysis. Instead, scores on the pre-test were used to 
assign each subject to a Level of Previous Science Knowledge (Level). All subjects 
scoring 16 or more points on the pre-test were removed, as these scores indicated strong 
pre-existing knowledge of electrical circuits. The remaining subjects were divided into 
three groups based on the pre-test scores; this provided a Level 1 group (N = 164) with 
pre-test scores between 3 and 10 points, a Level 2 group (N = 181) with pre-test scores of 
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11 or 12 points, and a Level 3 group (N = 211) with pre-test scores between 13 and 15 
points. The cut-off points were decided on to group students into similarly sized groups 
by Level of pre-existing knowledge. The district-provided 8th-grade science CRT scores 
for a random sample of 83 students were compared to their pre-test scores. There was a 
correlation of .33, p < .001, so the Levels were used in place of the planned proficiency 
scores.  
Type of instruction. Type of Instruction (Module) was a computer-provided 
lesson about electrical circuits (Appendix B). These lessons were presented as modules 
within an online learning management system known as Moodle. None of the modules 
were narrated and none contained animations. All contained multiple graphics related to 
the text. Module A (no analogy) presented the basic concepts related to electrical circuits. 
Module B (with an analogy) presented the basic concepts of electrical circuits and 
included an analogy with water in pipes. The analogy was presented as a graphic of an 
electrical circuit beside a water pipes circuit and the statement, “A circuit is like a water 
pipe.” Module C (with a mapped analogy) presented the basic concepts of electrical 
circuits and each component was explicitly mapped to an analog feature in a circuitous 
water pipe.  
Dependent variables. The dependent variables were the scores on a 20-point, 
researcher-developed test about electrical circuits (Appendix A). These were a repeated 
measure, as the same participants took the series of tests. Students were tested before 
instruction (pre-test), immediately after the instruction (post-test), and after a two-week 
interval (delayed post-test). Scores on the tests were used to determine if there was 
change in learning about electrical circuits.  
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Participants 
Data from 556 ninth- and tenth-grade students were used in this study. 
Characteristics of the sample are shown in Table 2. All subjects were in a year-long, 
beginning biology course. This required course was designed by the school district based 
on state standards. The high schools were selected because they had at least 10% of their 
students who had scored in each of the four levels of science proficiency on the eighth-
grade state CRT. Seven teachers at five high schools administered all three components 
of the study to 21 intact classes. Ninth- and tenth-grade students in biology classes were 
chosen as the study group for two reasons: (a) the biology course is focused on one 
science strand, unrelated to the study of electrical circuits, providing ecological validity 
for effects from the intervention (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002); and (b) students of 
this age have been studied by other analogy researchers (Brown & Clement, 1989; Duit et 
al., 2001; Mason, 2004; Yanowitz, 2001). 
Table 2 
Characteristics of Participants in Study 
aThe school district provided birthdates, gender, and the ethnicity coding used by the 
state. 
 
 Agea  Gendera 
 14 15  M F 
N 513 43  207 349 
% 92.4 7.6  37.2 62.8 
Ethnicitya 
 White Black Asian Hispanic American Indian 
Pacific 
Islander 
Multi-racial or 
Other 
N 302 74 27 118 3 8 24 
% 54.4 13.3 4.8 21.3 .5 1.4 4.4 
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No previous research was found on which to estimate the probable effect size for 
the independent variables, making it difficult to estimate sample size based on power or 
effect size. Factorial designs allow for fewer subjects, but interactions are more difficult 
to detect with smaller samples (Shadish et al., 2002). A rule of thumb for cell size is to 
have at least ten more subjects in each cell than dependent variables (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007). In this study, there were between 44 and 76 subjects per cell.  
Procedures 
Materials and Instruments 
Test construction. A bank of 60 multiple-choice, matching, and true/false 
questions about electrical circuits was developed. The test questions were prepared based 
on a set of item specifications for the components of the topic of electrical circuits 
(Osterland, 2006; Wiggins & McTighe, 2005). The standard related to electrical circuits 
was first analyzed for component knowledge and skills. Prerequisite knowledge includes: 
(a) understand that energy has different forms; and (b) list common uses for electricity. It 
was then determined that the subconcepts that make up understanding electrical circuits 
include: (a) what electricity is; (b) what the components of an electrical circuit are; and 
(c) the role of a battery in an electrical circuit. In addition, a vocabulary list was 
developed (Table 3). 
The eighth- and tenth-grade physical science textbooks currently used in this 
district were examined for questions about electrical circuits. Questions also came from 
released items from the state criterion-referenced tests, and additional questions were 
composed by two physical science teachers. Using principles of Understanding by Design 
(UbD), selected-response questions were written for each of the subconcepts (Wiggins & 
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McTighe, 2005). Each question was reviewed by three additional high school science 
teachers and coded as a knowledge/recall question, an understanding of the concept 
question, or an application of knowledge about the concept question (Osterlind, 2006). 
Previous studies have shown that students taught with analogies respond differently to 
different kinds of questions (Yanowitz, 2001). Questions were adjusted until there was a 
.90 inter-rater reliability. The raters’ suggestions for clarity in question stems and 
distractors were also considered. A balance of recall, understanding, and application 
questions were chosen for each subconcept, resulting in 60 questions. All questions were 
then compared against the vocabulary list and wording was adjusted to be consistent with 
that list   
Table 3.  
Vocabulary Associated with Electrical Circuits 
 Battery Electron Positive 
 Bulb Energy Switch 
 Circuit Field System 
 Components Flow Transfer 
 Conduct Loop Wire 
 Current Mechanism  
 Electricity Negative  
 
To check that the test questions measured knowledge of electricity, the original 
bank of questions was field tested with two groups of students, ninth-grade students near 
the end of their year-long biology class (N = 78, mean age 14.87 years), and a mixture of 
tenth- and eleventh-grade students near the end of their year-long Automotive 
Technology course, which included an extensive unit on electricity (N = 81, mean age 
15.91 years). Item analysis was done and 15 questions were deleted. On the remaining 45 
questions, the biology students scored an average of 56.34% and the automotive students 
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scored an average of 74.81%. The resulting, smaller bank of questions was a mixture of 
recall (47%), understanding (36%) and application (18%). 
The bank of questions was then organized into three different tests of 20 questions 
each, Test A, Test B, and Test C. Because each student would take all three tests, they 
were organized to have equivalent ratios of the different types of questions, different 
versions of the same question, and different orders for the questions. Only one question 
of the 45 appeared exactly the same on all three versions of the tests. This meant there 
was overlap in wording between Test A and Test B of seven questions, between Test A 
and Test C of eight questions, and between Test B and Test C of six questions. The types 
of questions for each test are shown in Table 4.  
Table 4.  
Types of Questions on Each Subtest 
 Test Bank Test A Test B Test C 
Recall 47% 22% 20% 20% 
Understanding 36% 16% 18% 18% 
Application 18% 7% 7% 7% 
 
Within the modules, the order of the tests was counterbalanced so that a test order 
was not associated with a Type of Instruction Module. The bank of questions, as well as 
Test A, Test B, and Test C, are in Appendix A. 
Instruction modules. Three instruction modules about electrical circuits were 
then developed, with assistance from the teachers who compiled the original bank of test 
questions. The concepts were listed out, as they were for the test questions, so that the 
instruction modules mirrored the tests. The modules were then reviewed by two high 
school physical science teachers and adjusted based on their recommendations. The topic 
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of electrical circuits was chosen for two reasons: (a) previous research about analogies 
has been done using the topic of electricity (Chi, 1992; Chiu & Lin, 2005; Clement & 
Steinberg, 2002; Dagher & Crossman, 1992; Paatz et al., 2004); and (b) electricity is not 
a topic the subjects receive instruction about during their biology course (Shadish et al., 
2002). 
Module A, which had no analogy, was composed first. It consisted of text and 
diagrams. Module A was then adjusted to include a graphic showing an electrical circuit 
and a circuitous water pipe, labeled “A circuit is like a water pipe.” This became Module 
B. A water pipe was used as the source for the analogy because of its frequent use in 
previous research about analogies in science education (Chiu & Lin, 2005; Clement & 
Steinberg, 2002; Paatz et al., 2004; Richland & McDonough, 2010). Module B was then 
adjusted to include the analogous features of the water pipe beside every diagram of an 
electrical circuit component. This was Module C. Field testing was done to test whether 
all of the modules took about the same amount of time for students. The time in the 
module section was recorded in the Moodle system. Time spent on the modules ranged 
from four minutes, 17 seconds to 18 minutes, 32 seconds. No statistically significant 
difference was found in the time students spent on type of modules, p < .001. The slides 
from each Instruction Module are in Appendix B. 
Computer use. All three instruction modules were  provided using a web-based 
Moodle learning management system. The Moodle environment is an open-source 
learning management system, used for online instruction and learning sites (Moodle, 
n.d.). Instruction components can be built in the system to serve the purposes of the 
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instruction. It houses a repository of resources used within modules. Users go to a URL 
provided by the instructor and sign in with a provided login and password.  
The Moodle environment for this study contained three modules, A, B, or C. Each 
module consisted of a pre-test, an instruction module, a post-test, and a delayed post-test. 
To counterbalance the order of the test forms, there were six different versions of each 
module, differing only in the order of the test forms. Restrictions were placed so that the 
participants had to complete the pre-test first. They were not allowed to move on to the 
instruction module on the same day as the pre-test. The instruction portion of the module 
had to be viewed before the post-test was activated. The participants were not allowed to 
move on to the delayed post-test until two weeks had passed after the instructional 
module and post-test.  
Each student used his or her district-generated student number as both the login 
and password. Each student number was assigned to a specific version of one of the three 
modules and could not be used to login to any other modules. For example, if a student 
was randomly assigned to Pre-test B, Module A , Post-test C, and Delayed Post-test A, 
that student could only access those components and in that order. All students used 
either their school’s existing computer lab or a laptop cart in the science classroom to log 
into the Moodle and access the materials, under the supervision of their classroom 
teacher. 
Assignment to Conditions  
Each subject was randomly assigned to one of the three modules, with 
counterbalanced test forms, in the Moodle learning management system. This random 
assignment was done with a random number generator, using each teacher’s group of 
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students as a sample, not each class of students. Level of science knowledge was not 
considered in assignment to conditions, as students were grouped by level only for 
analysis. 
Timeline 
This study took place over a six-week period, from September 27 – November 2, 
2012. Teachers continued regularly scheduled classroom instruction between the 
administration of the post-tests and the delayed post-tests. Data analysis was done during 
November and December, 2012.  
Student Activities 
Students first took a 20-question, multiple-choice pre-test about electrical circuits. 
Three of the teachers chose to use paper and pencil versions of the tests and gave them to 
the researcher for scoring. The other four teachers had their students do the pre-test in the 
Moodle system. The teachers requesting paper and pencil versions did so because of 
scheduling. High school computer labs and equipment are heavily scheduled and some 
were not able to schedule labs for a 10-minute test. No statistically significant differences 
in means were found among the test forms for those taking them paper and pencil or 
online, p < .001.  
Within a week of the pre-test, all students completed their assigned modules and 
post-tests in a computer lab or with laptops in mobile carts. All of the instruction modules 
and the post-tests were done online. After a slight delay of two weeks, students then took 
either a paper and pencil or online multiple-choice post-test about electrical circuits, 
again based on their teachers’ abilities to schedule computer equipment. All forms of all 
tests were either scored by the Moodle system or electronically through the use of 
103 
researcher-provided answer sheets that could be scanned. Because the sample size was 
large enough, no teachers were asked to have absent students make up any missed 
components. In each class, there was a small percentage of students without parent 
permission, student permission, or both. I provided paper and pencil or electronic 
crossword puzzles about cells for those students, so that the students were not singled in 
any way and the teachers did not have to plan for alternative instruction. None of these 
activities were collected, scored, or analyzed. 
Analysis 
Data Preparation 
For each student, the raw score on the pre-test, post-test, and delayed post-test 
was entered into a data set. For the Level factor, students were assigned to a group based 
on pre-test scores, and a code of 1 (pre-test scores of 3 - 10), 2 (pre-test scores of 11 or 
12), or 3 (pre-test scores of 13 – 15) proficient) was entered for each student. For the 
Type of Instruction Module factor, a code of 1 (Module A with no analogy), 2 (Module B 
with analogy), or 3 (Module C with mapped analogy) was entered for each student. 
Descriptive information (gender, age, ethnicity, and teacher) for each student was also 
entered. 
Data were collected from 714 students. Data were screened to see that every 
subject had been assigned to a module and had data from the pre-test. As the first step in 
data screening, results from 11th- and 12th-graders and those over the age of 15 years old 
were removed, as they were outside of the intended sample population. For the second 
step, results were removed for students who scored 16 points or higher on the pre-test, as 
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that indicated they understood electrical circuits well before instruction. This was done to 
address a probable ceiling effect. At that point, 580 cases remained.  
IBM SPSS®, version 21, was then used to screen for multivariate outliers, using 
the “unusual cases” command and pre-test, post-test, and delayed post-test as variables. 
This identified 24 unusual cases, ranging in impact from .38 to .85. At that point, 
Mahalanobis Distance maximum was16.10, below the critical χ2 value of 20.52 for five 
variables. 
Table 5.  
Number and Level of Knowledge of Subjects per Cell 
 
As the final step of data preparation, I considered deleting the data for the subjects 
who did not complete the delayed post-test. However, test statistics from an ANOVA 
indicated that there were statistically significant differences between those who 
completed the delayed post-test and those who did not, specifically on their pre-test 
scores, F(1,554) = 4.06, p = .044, and on their post-test scores, F(1,554) = 11.09, p = 
.001. Therefore, data from those without delayed post-test scores were included in the 
analysis and listwise allowances for missing data were used in analysis. 
Level of Knowledge Type of Instruction  
 Module A Module B Module C Total 
Level 1 N = 59 N = 44 N = 61 N = 164 
Level 2 N = 54 N = 66 N = 61 N = 181 
Level 3 N = 66 N = 76 N = 69 N = 211 
Total N = 179 N = 186 N = 191 N = 556 
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Sample size. The final number of subjects was 556. After listwise deletions 
during analysis, the analyzed sample size was 503. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) suggest 
that each cell should have 10 more subjects than there are dependent variables. In this 
study, the smallest group of subjects was 44 and the largest was 69. See Table 5 for 
sample sizes. 
Data Analysis 
SPSS®, version 21, was used to conduct a Repeated Measures Analysis of 
Variance (RM-ANOVA) on the dataset. This is an approach in which the dependent 
variables, in this case scores on the pre-test, post-test, and delayed post-test, are highly 
correlated and are measures from the same participants.  
The between-subjects factors were Type of Instruction Module (with three types 
as described above, Module A, Module B, and Module C) and Level (Level 1 for pre-test 
scores less than or equal to 10, Level 2 for pre-test scores of 11 or 12, and Level 3 for 
pre-test scores between 13 and 15). The within-subjects factor was Time (pre-test, post-
test, and delayed post-test). The dependent variables were the Scores on the pre-test, post-
test, and delayed post-test. 
First, analysis was done to measure any interactions among Module, Level and 
Time, based on the first research question for this study. Follow-up univariate tests were 
then done to measure any interactions between pairs of independent variables. Next, the 
main effects for statistically significant interactions were tested. Finally, tests on simple 
effects and pairwise comparisons were done in order to determine which of the variables 
had an effect on learning, as measured by the scores on the post-test and delayed post-
test. 
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Assumptions 
Normality. Kurtosis and skewness were tested for the dependent variables, pre-
test, post-test and delayed post-test. For the pre-test, skewness was -.559 and kurtosis was 
.319. For the post-test, skewness was -.433 and kurtosis was -.036. For the delayed post-
test, skewness was -.290 and kurtosis was -.121. All of these indicate reasonably normal 
distribution in the repeated measures. 
Linearity. Scatterplots were used to visually examine linearity among variables. 
No transformations were necessary. 
Homogeneity of variance. The homogeneity of variance (Box’s M) was rejected, 
p < .001. This is not unusual with large sample sizes in each cell. However, Pillai’s trace 
was used to evaluate multivariate significance. 
Sphericity. Sphericity indicates whether there is a pattern in the 
variance/covariance matrix of the observed data. This assumption did not hold, not 
unexpected with repeated measures, Mauchley’s W = .906, χ2 (2) = 42.10, p < .001; 
therefore Huynh-Feldt epsilon was used for adjustments when testing significance. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS FROM THIS STUDY 
Interactions 
The first test was for an interaction among all independent variables: Instruction, 
Level, and Time. The means and standard deviations are below (Table 6) for each of the 
factorial groups. 
Table 6.  
Means and Standard Deviations for Each Factorial Group 
Group N 
Time 
Pre-test  
M (SD) 
Post-test  
M (SD) 
Delayed Post-test 
M (SD) 
Module A 163  11.63 (2.14) 14.34 (2.84) 13.49 (3.00) 
Level 1  55 9.22 (1.07) 12.96 (2.88) 11.53 (2.62) 
Level 2  47 11.53 (0.50) 14.30 (2.64) 13.70 (2.82) 
Level 3  61 13.89 (0.79) 15.61 (2.37) 15.10 (2.42) 
Module B 164  11.80 (2.05) 14.39 (2.58) 13.40 (2.86) 
Level 1  35 8.83 (1.40) 13.00 (2.85) 12.23 (2.57) 
Level 2  62 11.40 (0.50) 14.44 (2.09) 13.19 (2.35) 
Level 3  67 13.72 (0.78) 15.07 (2.58) 14.21 (3.20) 
Module C 176  11.44 (2.29) 14.20 (2.75) 13.36 (2.92) 
Level 1  58 8.81 (1.52) 13.12 (2.78) 12.05 (3.26) 
Level 2  56 11.61 (0.49) 14.45 (2.54) 13.64 (2.69) 
Level 3  62 13.76 (0.78) 14.98 (2.62) 14.32 (2.31) 
Total 503  11.62 (2.17) 14.31 (2.72) 13.42 (2.92) 
 
Multivariate tests found no statistically significant interaction among Time (pre-
test, post-test, and delayed post-test), Level of previous knowledge of electrical circuits 
(Level 1, Level 2, Level 3), and Module (Module A, Module B, Module C), F(8,988) = 
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1.11, p = .351, partial η2 = .009. Scores did not vary differently as a function of different 
combinations of modules and levels.  
Time and Module 
Nor was there a statistically significant interaction between Time and Module, 
F(4,988) = 0.07, p = .992, partial η2 = .000. The test scores for each time of testing did 
not change differently based on the type of instruction. In other words, the pre-test scores 
were statistically similar for all three Modules, as were the post-test scores and the 
delayed post-test scores. Those subjects randomly assigned to Module A had scored an 
average of 11.63 questions correct on the pre-test, those randomly assigned to Module B 
had scored an average of 11.80 questions correct on the pre-test, and those randomly 
assigned to Module C had scored an average of 11.44 questions correct on the pre-test. 
None of these were statistically distinguishable from the pre-test average score of 11.62 
points correct. This pattern was similar for the post-test results and the delayed post-test 
results. The post-test average scores were 14.34, 14.39, and 14.20 respectively for 
Modules A, B, and C, statistically indistinguishable from the post-test average score of 
14.31. The delayed post-test average scores were 13.49, 13.40, and 13.36 respectively for 
Modules A, B, and C, statistically indistinguishable from the delayed post-test average 
score of 13.42. See Figure 1. 
Level and Module 
No statistically significant interaction between Module and Level was found, 
either, F(12,1482) = .99, p = .454, partial η2 = .008. Specifically for the pre-test, no 
statistically significant interaction between Module and Level, F(4,494) = .99, p = .412 
was found. This indicates that no Module-related differences in pre-test scores exist, 
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within each Level. The random assignment to Modules assured that each Level’s pre-test 
scores were statistically similar. Level 1 subjects randomly assigned to Module A had 
scored an average of 9.22 questions correct on the pre-test, those randomly assigned to 
Module B had scored an average of 8.83 questions correct on the pre-test, and those 
randomly assigned to Module C had scored an average of 8.81 questions correct on the 
pre-test. The differences between Modules were very similar for Level 2 subjects for the 
pre-test, with averages of 11.53, 11.40, and 11.61 questions correct for those assigned to 
Modules A, B, and C respectively. The differences between Modules were also very 
similar for Level 3 subjects for the pre-test, with averages of 13.89, 13.72, and 13.76 
questions correct for those assigned to Modules A, B, and C respectively. On the pre-test, 
none of the Levels, on any Module, scored notably different than their Level’s average 
score for that Module.  
Of interest for the second research question, the data were examined for 
differences in post-test scores because of interactions between Level and Module. None 
were found. The differences were not statistically significant, F(4,494) = .50, p = .737, 
partial η2 = .004, and indicated no practical significance. For Level 1 subjects, the post-
test averages were 12.96, 13.00, and 13.12 respectively for Modules A, B, and C, and 
similar to the Level 1 average on the post-test of 13.03. For Level 2 subjects, the post-test 
averages were 14.30, 14.44, and 14.45 respectively for Modules A, B, and C, and similar 
to the Level 2 average on the post-test of 14.40 points. For Level 3 subjects, the post-test 
averages were 15.61, 15.07, and 14.98 respectively for Modules A, B, and C, and 
statistically similar to the Level 3 average on the post-test of 15.22 points. 
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The data were then examined for differences in delayed post-test scores because 
of interactions between Level and Module. Again, none were found. The differences 
were not statistically significant, F(4,494) = 1.43, p = .224, partial η2 = .011, and 
indicated no practical significance. For Level 1 subjects, the delayed post-test averages 
were 11.53, 12.23, and 12.05 respectively for those assigned to Modules A, B, and C, and 
were statistically indistinguishable from the Level 1 average on the delayed post-test of 
11.90 points. For Level 2 subjects, the delayed post-test averages were 13.70, 13.19, and 
13.64 respectively for those assigned to Modules A, B, and C, and were statistically 
similar to the Level 2 average on the delayed post-test of 13.49 points. For Level 3 
subjects, the delayed post-test averages were 15.10, 14.21, and 14.32 respectively for 
those assigned to Modules A, B, and C, and were statistically similar to the Level 3 
average on the delayed post-test of 14.53 points.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Test Scores for Each Type of Module. 
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Modules  
The type of instruction, with no analogy (Module A), with an analogy (Module 
B), or with an explicitly mapped analogy (Module C), had no different effects on test 
scores. All three types of instruction led to the same amount and pattern of learning, as 
described later. 
Time and Level 
A statistically significant interaction between Time and Level was found, 
F(4,988) = 20.93, p < .001, partial η2 = .078. The scores from each Level of subjects 
changed differentially over time. At all three test times, the scores from each Level were 
statistically different from both the previous test time and from the other Levels. For the 
pre-test, the scores among Levels were significantly different, F(2,500) = 1145.29, p 
<.001, partial η2 = .82, as were the scores between Levels on the post-test, F(2,500) =  
30.06, p <.001, partial η2 = .11 and the scores between levels on the delayed post-test, 
F(2,500) = 39.02, p <.001, partial η2 = .14.  
Of more interest to this study, the effect of instruction, based on the differences 
between pre-test scores, post-test scores, and delayed post-test scores were different for 
each Level of previous knowledge of electrical circuits. Post hoc tests, using multiple 
comparisons and reporting Bonferroni corrections, showed the mean difference in scores 
between Levels narrowed between the pre-test and post-test, and expanded between the 
post-test and delayed post-test, although not to the original mean differences. The mean 
difference on the pre-test between Level 1 subjects and Level 2 subjects was 2.56 points, 
p < .001, and this narrowed to a mean difference of 1.37 points, p < .001, after instruction 
and a mean difference of 1.58 points, p < .001, two weeks after instruction. The gap 
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between the Level 1 subjects and the Level 2 subjects narrowed after instruction and 
stayed narrowed after a slight delay. The mean difference on the pre-test between Level 2 
subjects and Level 3 subjects was 2.27 points, p < .001, and this narrowed to a mean 
difference of 0.83 points, p < .003, after instruction and a mean difference of 1.03 points, 
p < .001, two weeks after instruction. After instruction, the gap between Levels 2 and 3 
subjects narrowed and stayed narrowed. The most dramatic narrowing was between 
Level 1 and Level 3 subjects. The mean difference on the pre-test between Level 1 
subjects and Level 3 subjects was 4.83 points, p < .001, and narrowed to 2.19 points, p < 
.001, after instruction and a mean difference of 2.61 points, p < .001, two weeks after 
instruction. 
 
Figure 2. Change Over Time by Different Levels. 
All three Levels of subjects made gains after instruction and then their scores 
decreased on the delayed post-test, although not to pre-instruction scores. The Level 1 
subjects made the most gains and the gaps between them and their counterparts narrowed. 
Level 1 
Level 2 
Level 3 
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Their mean on the post-test was 13.03 points, 5.06 points higher than their starting mean 
of 8.97 points. Their mean on the delayed post-test was 11.90 points, 1.13 points lower 
than their post-test mean, but still 2.93 points higher than their pre-test mean. Level 2 
subjects had a mean score of 14.40 points on the post-test, 2.89 points higher than their 
pre-test mean of 11.51 points. Their mean on the delayed post-test was 13.49 points, 0.91 
points lower than their post-test mean but still 1.98 points higher than their pre-test mean. 
Level 3 subjects benefitted from instruction the least. Their mean on the post-test was 
15.22 points, 1.44 points higher than their pre-test mean of 13.78. Their mean on the 
delayed post-test was 14.53, 0.69 points lower than their post-test mean but still 0.75 
points higher than their pre-test mean. 
Time 
Within subjects, the differences between the pre-test, post-test, and delayed post-
test scores were statistically significant, F(2,988) = 287.09, p < .001, partial η2 = .37, 
with Huynh-Feldt epsilon corrections for sphericity. Practically, time had a medium 
effect on the scores. Post hoc pairwise comparisons, using Bonferroni adjustments for 
multiple comparisons, indicated that there was a significant mean difference increase 
between pre-test scores and post-test scores of 2.80 points, p < .001, a significant mean 
difference decrease between post-test scores and delayed post-test scores of 0.88 points, p 
< .001, and a significant mean difference increase between pre-test scores and delayed 
post-test scores of 1.91 points, p < .001. For all Levels, subjects scored higher after 
instruction. Then, after a slight delay of two weeks, their scores dropped slightly (Figure 
2).  
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Level 
Statistically significant differences were found between all Levels for every test 
administration. It follows that, between subjects, the differences on combined scores were 
statistically significant, F(6,998) = 116.32, p < .001, partial η2 = .41. Practically, Level 
had a medium effect on the scores. Level 1 subjects scored the lowest combined scores, 
and Level 3 subjects scored the highest. Post hoc pairwise comparisons, using Bonferroni 
adjustments for multiple comparisons, indicated a significant mean difference of 1.97 
points, p < .001, between Level 1 subjects’ scores and Level 2 subjects’ scores, a 
significant mean difference of 1.47 points, p < .001, between Level 2 subjects’ scores and 
Level 3 subjects’ scores, and a significant mean difference of 3.44 points, p < .001, 
between Level 1 subjects’ scores and Level 3 subjects’ scores. Each group designated as 
a Level was a statistically distinct subset (Tukey HSD), p < .05.  
In summary, all groups benefitted from the instruction, both immediately after 
instruction and after a slight delay of two weeks; however, the type of instruction made 
no statistical difference. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
This section discusses the results of this study within the context of the Teaching 
With Analogies (TWA) model. A summary of the study’s findings is presented first, 
followed by implications for instruction, limitations of this study, and suggestions for 
further research. 
Summary 
Three research questions shaped this study: 1) Does explicit mapping of the 
source and target when using an analogy promote more learning than using an analogy 
without explicit mapping? 2) Do more-knowledgeable and less-knowledgeable learners 
benefit differentially from mapping? 3) Are there benefits over a short time related to 
either of the first two questions? 
The results from this study found no benefit for explicitly mapping source and 
target over simply presenting an analogy. I also found no benefit for using analogy over 
presenting the information without an analogy. Subjects scored significantly higher on 
the post-test after receiving instruction; however, no differences existed in the gains 
based on the type of instruction they received. Although the group that received 
instruction with an explicitly mapped analogy made the largest gain between the pre- and 
post-tests, it was not statistically different than the gains made in all instruction groups. 
These results suggest that students learned about electrical circuits from all three types of 
instruction. 
For the second research question, I found that the type of instruction provided did 
not differentially benefit a specific group of student, based on their previous knowledge 
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of the topic. Whether students knew very little about electricity, or were closer to a 
mastery level, they benefitted equally from all three types of instruction. The average 
gain between the pre-test and post-test was about the same, statistically, for those who got 
no more than half of the pre-test questions correct, those who got 11 or 12 pre-test 
questions correct, and those who got 13 to 15 of the pre-test questions correct. These 
results suggest that the type of instruction did not impact learning differentially for those 
with different levels of previous knowledge. 
The third research question was worthwhile only if benefits were found in the first 
two questions. For all three types of instruction and across all three levels of students, the 
same pattern emerged over time. Students made statistically significant gains between the 
pre-test and post-test, after instruction. The scores then dropped slightly on the delayed 
post-test but were still significantly different than the scores from the pre-test and from 
the post-test. These results suggest that students learned from the instruction and, two 
weeks later, evidence was found of learning, although not as much as right after 
instruction. Going back to the first two research questions, no statistically different 
patterns emerged based on either type of instruction, previous knowledge, or an 
interaction among them. 
Implications for Instruction 
The Teaching With Analogies (TWA) model of instruction was developed 
through examination of high school science textbooks and consists of six steps to use in 
classrooms: (a) introducing the target concept; (b) recalling a source concept; (c) 
identifying similar features; (d) mapping similar features; (e) drawing conclusions about 
the concepts; and (f) noting where the analogy breaks down (Glynn, 1991; Glynn et al., 
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1989). This study, in an attempt to start gathering quantitative evidence for this model, 
focused only on the third and fourth steps. Evidence was found that identifying similar 
features and mapping them between the source (in this case, a circuitous water pipe) and 
the target (in this case, an electrical circuit) helped students learn. However, statistically, 
the learning was not any stronger or weaker than the learning from the instruction that 
only used step one (no analogy) or the instruction that used steps one and two (with an 
unmapped analogy).  
Previous research has produced mixed results on whether instruction with 
analogies fosters learning in science education (Dagher et al., 1993; Glynn et al., 1989; 
Oliva et al., 2007; Pramling, 2009; Yanowitz, 2001), so the results of the analogy 
instruction in this study are not surprising. Glynn and Takahashi (1998) found the same 
pattern of increased recall and recognition of concepts immediately after instruction with 
analogies and a small decrease in the same after two weeks.  
Science teachers naturally use analogies (Dagher, 1995b; Dagher & Crossman, 
1992; Duit et al., 2001; Glynn, 2008), as do parents (Valle & Callanan, 2006), and 
working scientists (Coll, 2006; Dunbar, 2001; Holyoak, 2005). Analogies are a frequently 
used tool and will continue to be used. The question before educators is about the best 
way to scaffold and differentiate for each student by presenting and using analogies for 
learning. The importance of differentiating instruction to find the most effective way to 
reach each student is not lost on teachers (Allen & Tomlinson, 2000). Based on this 
study, the time and resources for explicitly mapping the features of the analogy may not 
be needed. If educators are going to use the TWA model of instruction, they may need to 
118 
critically evaluate the benefits to ensure that limited resources, such as instructional time, 
are used effectively.  
Other benefits may come, though, from using explicitly mapping analogies, such 
as peaking interest or refuting misconceptions. For example in studies done by Glynn and 
Takahashi (1998) and Paris and Glynn (2004), evidence was found that the participants 
found explanations that used the components of the TWA model significantly more 
interesting. These types of benefits were not tested in this study. However, a random 
sample of 79 students from the study found no statistically significant differences in the 
time students spent on the three instruction modules, p < .001. If students found one 
module more interesting than another, as a group they did not spend measurably more 
time in it. Many components influence learning, and it is prudent to consider as many as 
possible in making instructional decisions. 
It may also be that the Modules were helpful to students on different kinds of 
questions. It was outside the scope of the study; however, some of the previous research 
has shown that analogies can help some students answer better on questions that require 
higher order skills, such as making inferences (Yanowitz, 2001).  
For any model of instruction that may be used in science classrooms, all of the 
components of the model should be tested for efficacy, along with the interactions among 
the components, in a variety of environments, to ensure that classroom instruction 
practices can be based on evidence. In this study, no quantitative evidence was found for 
the need to explicitly map the features of the source and target in an analogy for an 
electrical circuit in a computer-based instruction module. At the same time, the explicitly 
mapped analogy led to the same scores on the post- and delayed post-tests as instruction 
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with an unmapped analogy and with no analogy. It was useful to the students, but not 
measurably more useful than the other types of instruction. 
Limitations of This Study 
Limitations exist in all educational research. Acknowledged limitations of this 
study may have influenced the results. First of all, this study was done within a limited 
age group. All students were 14- or 15-years-old and in either 9th- or 10th-grade. Younger 
students may benefit differently from the different types of instruction. Along with this, it 
is always best to be cautious about generalizing from a specific sample. These students 
were from five large, urban high schools within one school district. Their teachers did not 
volunteer, but they did have a choice about allowing their classes to participate. It may be 
that results would be more conclusive with a different sample. 
 Second, a single topic or concept was used. While this was done to eliminate 
variability in instruction, it may be that the topic of electrical circuits was not appropriate 
for identifying any effects. Another possibility exists that these students had already 
studied electrical circuits and did not need scaffolding from the analogy. Perhaps the 
instruction modules served as reminders of previous knowledge, rather than new 
understanding. This would be one way to account for the pattern of low pre-test scores, 
then significant increase in post-test scores after the instruction modules. The statistically 
significant drop in test scores on the delayed post-test, however, would not necessarily 
support this explanation. Along with a single topic, a single analogy was used. There may 
be other analogies that would be more useful to the students when learning about 
electricity.  
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Third, the Instruction Modules may not have been different enough to allow 
identification of interactions or effects. This study was also done with a single instance of 
computer-based instruction. It may be that explicitly mapping an analogy is important in 
a more extensive unit of instruction or when used in teacher-to-student or student-to-
student interactions. Blakes’ study (2004) using 9- through 11-year-olds, for example, 
was done over an extensive unit of instruction.  
Finally, the instrument used to measure learning may not have been appropriate 
for identifying interactions or effects. It was a researcher-developed tool, and was 
developed to measure conceptual knowledge as a mixture of recall, understanding, and 
application questions. It did not purport to measure other valuable components, such as 
making inferences, sparking interest, or refuting misconceptions.  
Next Steps 
Replication of Study 
I would suggest a replication of this study about explicitly mapping features of 
analogies, with some differences that may shed light on analogy use. First, the study 
could be replicated with different science concepts. It would be especially important to 
find a topic about which students had never been taught, as well as an analogy the 
students had not used. This could shed light on whether students in this study used all 
three modules to activate prior knowledge or to learn. 
I would also suggest that the instruction modules be more extensive, perhaps as 
units, rather than single, short lessons. This would provide information about whether 
analogies are measurably useful during lessons similar to those used in classroom 
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settings. I suggest that explicit mapping of analogies be examined in both teacher-led 
classroom settings and with computer-based instruction.  
Other Benefits of Explicitly Mapping Analogies 
Secondly, data should also be gathered on whether or not students find explicitly 
mapped analogies more interesting or more understandable than either instruction without 
analogies or instruction with unmapped analogies. Benefits from explicitly mapped 
features may not be tied directly to learning. These research questions would benefit from 
qualitative studies, also, to provide a more descriptive picture of how students learn from 
explicitly mapped features in analogies. Across a variety of topics and student ages, this 
could inform educators about the use of analogies to help learning through important 
aspects such as motivation and perseverance. Student misconceptions are a frequent 
concern in science education (Aubusson, 2006; Blake, 2004; Brown & Clement, 1989; 
Coll, 2006; Heywood, 2002; Vosniadou, 2007); further research with analogies could be 
shaped to study whether analogies are useful in helping students develop canonical 
understandings. Dunbar (2001) points out that analogy use under the examination of 
research is very different from the natural use of analogies. He suggests that research 
settings remove much of the opportunity for elaboration and change the goals of those 
being studied. 
Third, data should be gathered on whether the step of explicitly mapping 
analogies impacts the type of questions students are able to answer best. Yanowitz (2001) 
found that analogies were not especially useful for recall questions; however, Glynn and 
Takahashi (1998) found they were. In this study, care was taken to include a variety of 
types of questions on the test to measure learning, but analysis of the relationships 
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between the types of instruction and the types of questions was outside of the scope of the 
study. 
Explicit Mapping as Part of a Complete Model 
Finally, explicit mapping may be studied in combinations with the other 
components of the TWA model. This study looked at only identifying and explicitly 
mapping an analogy. Further research could provide data on the effects of interactions 
within the components of the model. It may be that learning is impacted differently by 
using all of the components of the TWA model. All analogies break down.  It would be 
important to test this, in a variety of settings, with different topics, and across different 
ages of students.  
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APPENDIX A 
TEST BANK 
1. The path through which a current flows is called a 
a. bulb. 
b. circuit. 
c. volt meter. 
d. battery. 
 
2. A circuit is a path through which a ___________ flows. 
a. current 
b. circuit 
c. volt meter 
d. battery 
 
3. Material that is a conductor has ______________________________ that can 
move from atom to atom. 
a. Free electrons 
b. Current 
c. Wires 
d. Positive particles 
 
4. Which of these bulbs will light? 
 
 
 
a. 
a.  b.  c. 
 d. All of them  e. None of them   
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5. What does a battery do in an electrical circuit? 
a. Pushes and pulls the current through the circuit. 
b. Sends electricity to a bulb. 
c. Sends an electron from one end of the wire to another. 
d. Uses energy to push the light to the bulb. 
 
6. Why does a bulb in a circuit light instantly? 
a. The electrons move to the bulb very quickly, faster than we can see. 
b. There are electrons all along the conductor (wire) and they repel the 
negative charge from electron to electron. 
c. The battery has a lot of energy and pushes it very quickly to the bulb 
where it turns into light energy. 
d. The wire is a superconductor that carries the electricity to the bulb faster 
than we can measure. 
 
7. Your friend asks you why he doesn’t feel a shock when he puts his hand near a 
battery. The best explanation is that 
a. A battery has to be connected to a switch that you turn on. 
b. A battery only works if there is something that needs to be turned on. 
c. The air between the battery and his hand is an insulator, not a conductor. 
d. The electrons go out into the air without a path to follow, so they don’t get 
to his hand. 
 
8. Is there a current in this piece of wire?   
a. Yes, because it is a complete circuit. 
b. Yes, because it is filled with electrons that repel each other. 
c. No, because it is not a conductor, so the circuit cannot be complete. 
d. No, because there is nothing to start the electrons moving. 
 
9. This circuit would not work because 
a. Electricity has to flow to the bulb out of both ends of the battery. 
b. The current leaves the negative pole and needs to return through the 
positive pole. 
c. The wires are attached to the wrong 
end of the battery. 
d. The current would go through the light 
bulb because it follows the wire. 
 
 
 
 
+ - 
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10. This circuit would work because 
 
 
a. Electricity has to flow to the bulb out of both ends of the battery. 
b. The wire can conduct the current through both sides of the bulb. 
c. The current gets used up in the light bulb and drains the battery. 
d. The current leaves the negative pole and returns to the positive pole. 
 
11. What happens when a negative charge is pushed towards an electron by a battery? 
a. A negative charge repels a negative charge, moving the charge from 
electron to electron.  
b. A positive charge repels a positive charge, moving the charge from 
electron to electron. 
c. A negative charge is attracted to the electron, moving the charge from 
electron to electron. 
d. A positive charge is attracted to the electron, moving the charge from 
proton to proton. 
 
12. How is the current returned to the battery? 
a. The current does not return to the battery and is used up in the bulb. 
b. The current is pushed from one end of the battery and pulled from the 
other. 
c. The current moves through the conductor until it comes to a gap. 
d. The current moves through the insulator and back to the battery. 
 
13. Why does a battery need a positive end? 
a. The negative end attracts electrons and the positive end repels them. 
b. The positive end attracts electrons, pulling the charge through the circuit. 
c. The positive end sends out a negative charge, pushing it through the 
circuit. 
d. The positive end grounds the circuit so that the electricity cannot escape. 
 
14. What makes the light bulb glow? 
a. The electricity is being changed and released as light energy. 
b. The electrons react with the thin wire inside the light bulb, producing 
light. 
c. The current meets resistance when it reaches the thin wire in the bulb and 
light energy is produced as the current moves past. 
d. The battery sends energy to the bulb through the wires to light up the bulb. 
+ - 
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 15. Which sequence shows the correct flow of the current? 
a. A to B to C to D 
b. A to D and A to B 
c. A to B and D to C 
d. D to C and C to D 
 
 
16. This diagram represents electrons in a conducting wire. How does the charge get 
from A to D? 
 
 
 
a. The electron entering at A gets repelled through the electrons to D. 
b. The negative charge entering at A repels the negative charges from the 
electrons near B to towards the electrons near C. The negative charge near 
C gets repelled towards D. 
c. The electron from A moves between the electrons near B, to C, and then 
leaves at D. 
d. The negative charge entering at A is attracted to the electrons near B and 
then towards the electrons near C. The negative charge near C is attracted 
towards D. 
 
Match these terms and definitions. 
 
17. Electron a. a substance with free electrons  
18. Proton b. a positively charged particle  
19. Battery c. a source of energy that pushes charges  
20. Conductor d. a flow of charges   
21. Current e. a negatively charged particle  
 
 
+ - A 
D C 
B 
- 
AD- C
 
B
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True or False? 
22. Electricity can flow through a broken wire as long as the break is not really large. 
a. True b. False 
23. The current coming back into the battery is used up when it gets there. 
a. True b. False 
24. Copper wires are wrapped in plastic because plastic is not a conductor. 
a. True b. False 
25. A current leaves the positive end of a battery and returns through the negative 
end. 
a. True b. False 
26. Electrons move very, very slowly through a conductor. 
a. True b. False 
27. A switch can be used to open and close a circuit. 
a. True b. False 
28. There is resistance when the current reaches the thin wire in a bulb and the thin 
wire heats up. 
a. True b. False 
29. Negative charges repel negative charges. 
a. True b. False 
30. Charges move very, very slowly through a conductor. 
a. True b. False 
31. A circuit is the path that charges follow. 
a. True b. False 
32. The charges in the circuit that come back into a battery can re-charge it. 
a. True b. False 
 
33. Which of the following are necessary for an electrical circuit? 
a. Conductor, bulb, switch 
b. Battery, conductor 
c. Bulb, conductor, battery 
d. Battery, bulb 
 
34. Electricity is the movement of electric charge from one place to another. 
a. True b. False 
35. Like charges repel and unlike charges attract. 
a. True b. False 
 
36. What will happen with these particles? 
 
a. They will move away from each other. 
b. They will stay where they are. 
c. They will move towards each other. 
d. They will move back and forth. 
 
  - + 
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37. Glass is an insulator because it has no 
a. Electrons and protons. 
b. Wires inside it. 
c. Free electrons. 
d. Electrical source. 
 
38. Why are metals good conductors? 
a. They have lots of negatively charged electrons. 
b. They carry electrons very fast. 
c. They are not made of glass. 
d. They have free electrons that can move. 
 
39. Why don’t we sense electrical forces between us and our environment? 
a. Electrical forces need a path to follow. 
b. Electrical forces are very, very weak. 
c. Electrical forces are very, very strong. 
d. Electrical forces need a battery or plug. 
 
40. Why don’t the electrons in a penny jump out? 
a. There are no free electrons in a penny. 
b. They don’t have a battery to charge them. 
c. Electrons need a path to follow. 
d. The penny has protons that repel the electrons. 
 
41. What is the source for the electrons that move in a current? 
a. The battery supplies electrons. 
b. The conductor is full of electrons. 
c. The insulator is full of electrons. 
d. The bulb sends out the electrons. 
 
42. Do more electrons flow out of a battery than into it? 
a. Yes, that is why the battery doesn’t last forever. 
b. No, the battery pushes electrons from one end and pulls them from the 
other. 
c. Yes, the battery sends electrons to the light bulb where they turn into light 
energy. 
d. No, the battery creates electrons that flow out into the conductor and 
through the circuit. 
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43. Are the electrons flowing in the circuit provided by the battery? 
a. Yes, that is why the battery doesn’t last forever. 
b. Yes, the battery sends electrons to the light bulb where they turn into light 
energy. 
c. No, the battery creates electrons that flow out into the conductor and 
through the circuit. 
d. No, the battery pushes electrons in the conductor from one end and pulls 
them from the other. 
 
44. What happens if there is a gap in the circuit? 
a. The current must cross the gap and that takes more energy. 
b. The current does not have a path and stops. 
c. The current must create a path and keep going. 
d. The current goes out into the gap and creates a shock. 
 
45. What are the two kinds of electrical charge? 
a. Positive and neutral. 
b. Negative and balanced. 
c. Positive and balanced. 
d. Negative and positive. 
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Components of Test A, Test B, and Test C 
R = Recall 
K = Knowledge/Understanding 
A = Application 
Question Test Bank 
Test 
A 
Test 
B 
Test 
C 
1 R R R   
2 R     R 
3 R R   R 
4 A   A   
5 K K     
6 K K   K 
7 A A   A 
8 A   A   
9 A A     
10 A     A 
11 K   K K 
12 K K   K 
13 A A A   
14 R   R   
15 K K K   
16 K   K   
17 R R     
18 R   R   
19 R R R R 
20 R R R R 
21 R R R R 
22 K K     
23 R   R   
24 K   K K 
25 R   R   
26 R R     
27 R     R 
28 R     R 
29 R R     
30 R   R   
31 R       
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Question Test Bank 
Test 
A 
Test 
B 
Test 
C 
32 K     K 
33 K K     
34 R R   R 
35 R       
36 K     K 
37 R R     
38 K   K   
39 A       
40 A     A 
41 K K K   
42 K     K 
43 K   K K 
44 K   K   
45 R     R 
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APPENDIX B 
INSTRUCTIONAL MODULES 
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